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The development of international trade requires predictability and uniformity of the applicable
legal framework. Such requirements can be satisfied by means of international uniform
commercial law conventions, which try to set forth coherent and uniform bodies of substantial
rules. A key role is also played by private international law, an instrument operating at a different
level but often included in the uniform conventions themselves. This paper analyzes the
relationship between international uniform commercial law conventions and private international
law to investigate how it has developed over the last seventy years, and suggests a new approach
to international commercial transactions in terms of coordination rather than alternativeness of
the two different instruments.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1.1

Historical Remarks

The statalization of the fountains of law, started in Europe in the nineteenth century
through the enactment of national codes and statutes, caused the differentiation of private law on
the basis of national states.1 This evolution in the production of law was, on the other hand, in
contrast with the international character of trade, which already covered areas larger than
national borders and would have further developed in the future. There is no doubt that the
nationality of private law - and especially of commercial law - constituted (and still constitutes) a
serious obstacle for economic relationships involving persons and enterprises of different
countries and therefore subject to different (and often conflicting) jurisdictions.2 In fact, the flow
of international trade is strictly connected with the need for certainty and predictability of
applicable law: merchants, businessmen and professional carriers3 need to organize in advance
their economic and financial activities and thus want to previously know how risks, obligations

1

Since the Middle Age, merchants could overcome local laws and regulations by means of the so called lex
mercatoria, a body of rules created by the same merchants and their commercial courts and recognized throughout
Europe. For a brief historic review, see FRANCO FERRARI, VENDITA INTERNAZIONALE DI BENI MOBILI 2
(1994).
2
For this historic perspective see for instance FRANCESCO GALGANO, ATLANTE DI DIRITTO PRIVATO
COMPARATO at 211 (1999); FRANCO FERRARI, LE CONVENZIONI DI DIRITTO DEL COMMERCIO
INTERNAZIONALE XII (2002).
3
For an extensive analysis of the relationship between multi-state commerce and need for predictability, with
specific reference to international carriage of goods, see ANTONIO MALINTOPPI, DIRITTO UNIFORME E DIRITTO
INTERNAZIONALE PRIVATO IN TEMA DI TRASPORTO 11-14 (1955).

1

and rights are allocated between the parties to an international transaction.4 Such issues are
clearly jeopardized by the plurality of national laws, while – as recognized by legal writers5 and
drafters of international conventions6 – are promoted by the unification of the various rules
governing transnational commerce.
It is then not surprising that, in order to deal with the diversity of national laws, the
international community has long made efforts on the way to unify commercial law. Since the
end of the nineteenth century, international organizations have drafted and adopted conventions
containing uniform provisions in specific areas of trade, to be ratified by single states and
received into their national legislations.7

Can this be enough?

If it is true that uniform

commercial law conventions can overcome legal problems deriving from a conflict of different
domestic rules (or at least reduce their impact) and promote certainty, predictability and
uniformity in the international trade, it is on the other hand also true that they are not the ultimate
answer.
Uniform commercial law conventions aim at regulating, in their relevant specific matters,
the largest possible array of transactions, since it is believed that transnational legal problems can
be better faced on an international level.8 On the other hand, international conventions do not
cover all legal issues possibly arising in the course of an international transaction. Several

4

A brief example may give an idea of problems arising out from a multi-jurisdiction transaction. Part A resident in
state X sends goods to part B resident in state Y through a carrier C resident in state Z; if a claim related to such fact
pattern arises (non-conformity of the goods, delay in delivery or payment, defective carriage etc.), a national court
may have to decide among three different and conflicting national laws in order to establish which is the law
applicable to the dispute.
5
See for a similar statement FRANCO FERRARI, INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 1 (1999).
6
See for instance the Preamble of the UNIDROIT Convention on International Factoring (“The States Parties to this
Convention […], recognizing therefore the importance of adopting uniform rules to provide a legal framework that
will facilitate international factoring […]”) and the UNIDROIT Convention on International Leasing (“The States
Parties to this Convention, recognizing the importance of removing certain legal impediments to the international
financial leasing […], recognizing therefore the desiderability of formulating certain uniform rules relating
primarily to civil and commercial law aspects of international financial leasing […]”).
7
See FRANCO FERRARI, supra note 5, at 3.
8
See id. at 4.
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questions, relevant for the otherwise governed transactions, are often (explicitly or implicitly)
excluded from the conventions’ scope of application or simply not considered at all. This is not
surprising if one considers that international conventions, in order to have a significant impact on
international trade, are often the result of compromises among conflicting and sometimes
opposite legal systems.9

Thus, beside the basic uniform substantive rules established by

international conventions, there are other legal issues that have to be dealt with by means of
substantive rules external to the same conventions.10 The instrument to determine such rules is
traditionally private international law.11

1.2. Private International Law
Private international law
problems.13

12

is actually an older way to deal with conflict of laws

An history of the development of private international law would be here

impossible14 and also not necessary for the purposes of the present paper, which basically is to
investigate the relationship between uniform commercial law conventions and private
9

A typical example in this sense is offered by the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale
of Goods, which under Article 4 expressly states that “[…] it is not concerned with […] the effect which the contract
[of sale] may have on the property in the goods sold.”. The reason of this exclusion is that it was not possible to find
a common solution on the issue of the transfer of property, which is governed by completely different rules in the
main national legal systems.
10
See expressly ANTONIO MALINTOPPI, supra note 3, at 31.
11
See id.
12
“Private international law” is the traditional term used in civil law systems to indicate what in common law
jurisdictions is known as “conflict of laws”. More precisely, it refers to one of the three main areas covered by
“conflict of laws”: the “choice of law” (the other two areas are “jurisdiction” and “recognition and enforcement of
judgments”). In this paper, we will use both terms to indicate those (mainly) national rules which determine the
applicable law between two or more relevant jurisdictions involved in a specified transaction.
13
See Arthur T. Von Mehren, Special Substantive Rules for Multistate Problems: Their Role and Significance in
Contemporary Choice of Law Methodology, 88 HARV. L. REV. 347, 349-350 (1974), according to whom “the
discipline of choice of law is concerned with the identification and systematic handling of situations in which the
persons concerned and the interests and policies at stake have significant connections with more than one
community”.
14
The origins of what has been later called “private international law” can be found in the “theory of statutes” by the
Italian jurist and professor of law Bartolo da Sassoferrato in the XIV century. Basically, Bartolo established a set of
rules governing the frequent conflicts among the numerous different statutes of the Italian municipalities in the

3

international law itself. It is here sufficient to make clear that when a conflict between two (or
more) national laws arises (or, as sometimes the doctrine says, a case presents an element of
“extraneousness”) and no uniform law is available (because in the subject matter there is no
uniform law at all or because an existing uniform law is in the specific case not applicable), the
rules of private international law are applied to determine which national substantive law is to
govern the case at hand.15
If private international law provides for a solution in case of conflict of law issues, it is on
the other hand easy to understand that such solution may not be always a satisfactory one for the
purposes of certainty and uniformity. The substantive law determined by private international
law is going to be a domestic law (the national law of one of the parties, often to the displeasure
of the other party) and not a uniform law; moreover, the conflict of law rules may strongly differ
according to the forum deciding the dispute at hand and therefore are likely to lead to very
different outcomes.16 Of course, this seems to be opposite to the mentioned need for certainty,
predictability and uniformity in international trade.

1.3. Uniform Commercial Law Conventions and Private International Law
Even though uniform commercial law conventions are probably the best way to promote
the flow of international trade, we have also seen that the traditional and general instrument of
private international law may be necessary to deal with legal issues connected to an international

Middle Ages. Thanks to the authority of Bartolo and to their large success, the rules of the theory of statutes
continued playing a major role up to the end of the XVIII century.
15
The rules of private international law to be applied to a case are those in force in the state of the court seized with
the case (i.e. the “forum”). Such rules are usually of national origin but they may also derive from international
conventions.
16
In order to deal with the differences of national conflict of laws rules, international conventions of uniform private
international law have been drafted. Famous examples are the 1955 Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods or the 1980 Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual
Obligations.
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commercial transaction but not governed by uniform provisions.17 Thus, a lawyer or a court
dealing for instance with an international sale of goods are forced to consider not only the
existing international uniform law (specifically in this case, the United Nations Conventions on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods) but also the conflict of law rules leading to one or
more domestic laws.
It should be quite manifest, at this point, the necessary co-existence of these two different
tools in transnational business. What we think needs to be investigated, however, is how the
relationship between private international law and international conventions has developed and
could evolve to better serve the fundamental need for uniformity.18 Just to anticipate some
questions: do international conventions consider private international law or just ignore it? Do
they recognize any role for it? Do they provide private international law as a general or specific
instrument and, if yes, which techniques are used? What is the evolution in the connection
between international uniform laws and private international law?
The above and other related questions will find an answer in this research. Nevertheless,
it is important to point out from the beginning that the present paper is not a research on private
international law and that therefore such instrument is studied only to the extent necessary to
analyze the relationship with uniform laws. To that purpose, it is necessary to explain here some
definitions referring to the role of private international law respect to uniform substantive laws
that will be largely used in this paper:19
a) supplementary function (external relevance): uniform laws are not exhaustive,
therefore when they do not cover specific matters and do not provide for any specific rule (as in
17

See ANTONIO MALINTOPPI, supra note 3, at 23, that emphasizes the connection between uniform substantive
conventions and private international law.
18
The need to study uniform conventions together with their impact on private international law was emphasized
many years ago by id., at 27.
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case of external gaps), private international law is the traditional way to determine the nonuniform substantive law to be applied to fill in the gaps;
b) substitutive function (external relevance): when uniform laws allow parties to the
governed transaction to exclude the uniform rules or to derogate from them, private international
law is the way to determine the national law (or other rules) substituting the uniform discipline;20
c) subsidiary function (internal relevance): sometimes uniform laws do cover or at least
include some matters but do not provide for any discipline (as in case of internal gaps); in these
cases, if no internal solution can be found in conformity with the principles on which the uniform
law is based, private international law remains the way to fill in the gap (as expressly stated, for
example, by the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods and
by the Unidroit Ottawa Conventions of 1988).
We will see that uniform conventions, even though with very different approaches,
always contain provisions dealing with conflict of laws. In some cases, the non-uniform law to
be applied is expressly determined (direct application). In other cases, reference is made only to
conflict of laws rules and the national law to be applied has to be determined according to those
rules (indirect provisions). In the course of the present paper, we will refer to both types of
provisions as to “applicable law provisions” and they will be the main subject of our analysis.

19

See FRANCO FERRARI, IL FACTORING INTERNAZIONALE 13-14 (1999).
This is true not only when parties do not state which is the national law to be applied but also when they explicitly
or implicitly refer to a particular national law. Party autonomy is in fact one of the connecting factors (probably the
main factor, as shown for example by the above cited 1980 Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual
Obligations) of private international law and therefore a provision recognizing it to determine the national
substantive law is a conflict of laws provisions. There are states, on the contrary, that do not recognize party

20

6

1.4. Purpose and Structure of the Present Paper
The present research paper intends to investigate the relationship between some of the
most important uniform commercial law conventions and private international law.

More

precisely, it wants to analyze how the particular instrument of the uniform conventions has used
the general instrument of the conflict of laws rules.
In order to properly investigate the matter, this paper will analyze several commercial law
conventions that cover formally the last seventy years, but are sometimes based on precedent
body of uniform rules going back to the second half oh the nineteen century. The conventions
analyzed in this paper have been chosen also because, thanks to their significant impact on the
international trade (some of them are concerned with the international carriage of goods - by sea,
by air, by road and by rail – , others with the most important “mercantile contracts”21 like sale of
goods, factoring, leasing and assignment of receivables), let us understand the evolution in the
unification of substantive commercial law and in the techniques for the use of private
international law.
For a better understanding, the conventions chosen in this paper can be virtually divided
into two groups.

The first group (Chapters II to V) includes four conventions regulating

international carriage of goods, which has been always a typical multi-jurisdiction transaction.
Such conventions cover a quite long period of time, since 1929 to 1980, but their purpose and
structure is very similar.22

They establish a uniform regime for (i) the carrier’s monetary

liability, and (ii) the requisites for the carriage documents.

Thus, the carriage of goods

autonomy as a connecting factor. Under the Brazilian private international law, for instance, a choice of law by the
parties has no legal effect.
21
See FRANCO FERRARI, supra note 5, at 2.
22
The common origin, structure and purpose of the carriage of goods uniform conventions and their attitude to be
analyzed as an autonomous system are expressly recognized, for instance, by ANGELO PESCE, IL TRASPORTO
INTERNAZIONALE DI MERCI 16 (1995).
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conventions are all characterized by a common element: they have been given a mandatory force
and no room is left to party autonomy to alter the uniform discipline, with particular respect to
the possibility of limiting the carrier’s liability, due to the economic function of the international
carriage that can be considered of “public interest”.23 Nevertheless, these conventions do contain
some particular provisions that make applicable a different domestic law. We will see the
problems deriving from such applicable law provisions and how the room for non-uniform laws
has changed from one convention to another.
The second group of conventions (Chapters VI to VIII) considers a more limited period
of time, since 1980 to 2001. It focuses on uniform laws regarding some very widespread
international mercantile contracts: sale of goods, leasing, factoring and assignment of
receivables. These conventions are particularly suitable to show a different and new approach to
private international law, because they not only broadly recognize party autonomy and the
possibility to derogate (partially or even totally) from the uniform disciplines but also expressly
use conflict of laws rules as particular or general way to govern certain contractual issues.
Every convention in this paper has been analyzed according to a common scheme. After
a brief historical introduction, attention is paid to the scope of application and to the provisions
dealing with the mandatory or non-mandatory character of the law. The core of the analysis is in
the paragraphs dedicated to provisions dealing with applicable law issues and the role of private
international law. Even though sometimes the analysis will focus on specific issues governed (or
not governed) by the conventions, it is to be borne in mind that – like it is not a work on private
international law – this is not a paper on commercial law conventions. The subject matter of this
paper is only the relationship between conventions and private international law and the analysis

23

For a clear statement about the economical function of the carrier in the international trade and the consequent
reason for uniformly limiting his monetary responsibility see id., at 10, 14.
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is aimed only at evaluating the evolution of such a relationship. Our final purpose is to suggest
an answer to the key question: which is the type of relationship between private international law
and international conventions that can serve uniformity in international trade at best?

9

CHAPTER 2
CONVENTION FOR THE UNIFICATION OF CERTAIN RULES RELATING TO
INTERNATIONAL CARRIAGE BY AIR
(THE WARSAW CONVENTION), 1929

2.1. Historical Remarks
The Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules relating to International Carriage by
Air (commonly known as Warsaw Convention) was born to give an answer to the difficulties as
to conflict of laws emerging in the 1920’s, the era in which carriage of goods by air was growing
in importance.27 Since even the adoption of the standard conditions of carriage by air prepared
by the International Air Traffic Association (IATA)28 proved to be not sufficient to avoid
significant differences in interpretation and application in different countries, the Warsaw
Convention was signed in the year 1929. The underlying main purpose was to protect the then
emerging air transportation industry from massive claims. This aim was dealt with by regulating
two main issues: (i) the limitation of the international carrier’s liability in case of damages to
passengers and goods, and (ii) the setting of a uniform standard for the carriage’s
documentation.29

27

DAVID A. GLASS & CHRIS CASHMORE, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF CARRIAGE OF GOODS 205 (1989).
The International Air Transport Association is a private agency of international carriers.
29
See Katherine A. Staton, The Warsaw Convention’s Facelift: Will it Meet the Needs of 21st Century Air Travel?,
62 J. AIR L. & COM. 1083, 1085 (1997) according to whom two primary goals were “to obtain a certain degree of
uniformity as to documentation, tickets, airways bills and liability rules which govern international aviation travel,
and to limit the potential liability of the young air carrier industry in accidents that involve personal injury or death
to passengers in exchange for limiting the carrier’s defenses”.
28
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According to the Convention, the original carrier’s damage liability was quite low in the
amount, and this point was the main question under discussion and critics. Thus, after the year
1929 the Warsaw Convention has been amended and modified several times.

The Hague

Protocol in 1955, for example, doubled the carrier’s liability for death or injury to passengers and
the Convention was made applicable to the carrier’s servants and agents.
In the year 1961, the Guadalajara Convention resolved another vexata quaestio: the
definition of the “actual carrier”. From the original text it was not clear whether the Convention
was applicable both to the contracting carriers and to the actual carrier (meaning the one which
“performs transportation on behalf or in place of the contracting carrier”).30 .Neither the original
Warsaw Convention nor the Hague Protocol had dealt with the problem of the carriage
completely subcontracted to another carrier or partially subcontracted without the agreement of
the customer. It was then suggested that this “actual carriers” did not enjoy the protection of the
Convention.31 The Guadalajara Convention made clear that both the contracting carrier and the
actual carrier have the same rights and are liable under the Convention, so that the plaintiff can
sue either the former or the latter for damages. Accordingly, the Guadalajara Convention added
a fifth forum to the four ones already established by Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention: the
place where the actual carrier is ordinarily resident or has its principal place of business.
Even after all the above mentioned modifications and additions to the original text, the
United States still considered the carrier’s liability limit as too low and actually threatened to
denounce (i.e. to withdraw from) the original Warsaw Convention. Through the efforts of IATA,
an agreement was reached in the year 1966 (the Montreal Agreement), which set forth a higher

30

LAWRENCE B. GOLDHIRSCH, THE WARSAW CONVENTION ANNOTATED: A LEGAL HANDBOOK 7 (2000).
GLASS & CASHMORE, supra note 27, at 206.
33
See Article 1(1).
31
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limit of liability (equivalent to 75.000 US dollars) in case of flights to, from or through the
United States and made the recovery of damages more practicable.
Other modifications, directed to raise the monetary limitations, were made later by the
Guatemala Protocol of 1971 and the Montreal Protocols of 1975, the last of which came into
force in the year 1999.
The Warsaw Convention is currently administered by the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO), a specialized agency of the United Nations located in Montreal, Canada.

2.2. Scope of Application
The Warsaw Convention applies to international carriage of goods, persons or luggage
performed by aircraft.33 This is the carriage “in which the place of departure and the place of
destination, as agreed in the contract, are within the territory of two different states, both of
which are parties to the convention, whether or not there is an agreed stopping place in the
territory of a third state”,34 or in which these places are within the territory of a single contracting
State if there is an agreed stopping place in another State, whether contracting or whether not
contracting.35

Therefore, according to the Warsaw Convention, the contract of carriage is

international when (i) at least two different states are involved in the transportation, and (ii) this
is agreed upon by the parties in the contract. The nationality of the parties to the contract of
carriage does not play here any role. In order for the Convention to be applicable, moreover,
another element is necessary: (iii) at least one of the states involved in the carriage must be a
contracting state.

34
35

JASPER RIDLEY, THE LAW OF THE CARRIAGE OF GOODS BY LAND, SEA AND AIR 41 (4th ed. 1975).
See Article 1(2).
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The Warsaw Convention defines itself as the only applicable law on international
transportation by air as defined by Article 1(2). The definition of the Convention’s – of any
convention’s – scope of application constitutes “a special conflict rule, prevailing over the
general conflict rules of [any] national law which would otherwise apply”.36

Thus, when

carriage is “international” in the sense of the Warsaw Convention, no other law may be applied
by any forum wherever located, because the national conflict of laws rules are rendered
irrelevant.37 In sum, the Warsaw uniform provisions “constitute the mandatory law of the
contract”,38 and any parties’ agreement to the contrary is irrelevant.39

2.3. The Convention as the Only Applicable Law
The conclusion discussed above is consistent with the main purpose of the Warsaw
Convention, that – as can be said, mutatis mutandis, about every international uniform law – is to
create uniformity “with respect to air carriers and to supplant each member nation’s domestic
laws if they differed from the terms of the Convention”.40 This purpose cannot be frustrated by
the parties by altering the regime of liability set forth by the Convention. Accordingly, Article
23, states that “any provision tending to relieve the carrier of liability or to fix a lower limit than
that which is laid down in this Convention shall be null and void”. Therefore, “the Convention

36

Ludovico M. Bentivoglio, Conflicts Problems in Air Law, ACADEMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, RECUEIL

DES COURS, 69-182, 131 (1966 III), Tome 119.
37

See the English decision in Grein v. Imper. Airways LTD., under rules “…in effect an international code declaring
the rights and liabilities of the parties to contracts of international carriage by air; and when by the appropriate
machinery they are given the force of law in the territory of a High Contracting Party they govern (so far as regards
the courts of that party) the contractual relations of the parties to the contract of carriage of which (to use language
appropriate to the legal system of the United Kingdom) they become statutory terms”.
38
Bentivoglio, supra note 36, at 132.
39
See Grey v. Amer. Airlines: “…the terms of the convention apply by its own terms and not because the parties
have so agreed”.
40
GOLDHIRSCH, supra note 30, at 5. See also the Preamble to the Convention, which declares that the purpose of
the Warsaw Convention is to regulate “in a uniform manner the conditions of international transportation by air in
respect of the documents used for such transportation and of the liability of the carrier”.
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itself becomes the law of the contract”41 in a mandatory sense and, as stated by Article 32, “any
clause contained in the contract and all special agreements between the parties purporting to
infringe the rules laid down by the Convention, whether by deciding the law to be applied or by
altering the rules as to jurisdiction, shall be null and void”.
The scheme of the Warsaw Convention is actually clear: the uniform law establishes a
general presumption of liability on the part of the carrier and a limitation of such liability to a
maximum amount of money. The carrier may not alter this set of rules42 either by excluding or
lowering his liability (Article 23), or by choosing a different law or jurisdiction (Article 32). All
questions regarding the carrier’s liability are faced by the Convention: the events in which the
liability arises, the events in which this liability becomes without limitation, the vicarious
liability and the role of contributory negligence.

No room seems to be left for private

international law.

2.4. Applicable Law Provisions
We have seen that the parties (and especially the carrier) to an international contract of
carriage by air may not choose any law different from the Convention or anyway exclude,
change or limit the scope of the uniform discipline. On the other hand, although it does not
contain any general rules on conflicts of laws,43 the Convention sometimes “adopts a special
conflicts rule”44 regarding some specific questions.45 More specifically, there are at least five

41

Bentivoglio, supra note 36, at 127.
A good list of examples of specific contractual provisions, both valid and invalid under the Convention, is offered
by GOLDHIRSCH, supra note 30, at 139-142.
43
See O. N. Sadikov, Conflicts of Law in International Transport Law, ACADEMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL,
RECUEIL DES COURS, 189, 242 (1985 I), Tome 190, according to whom it was believed, at the time of the
Diplomatic Conference in 1929, that references to national law would “undermine the role of unified rules on
carriage included in the convention”.
44
Bentivoglio, supra note 36, at 128.
45
Sadikov, supra note 43, at 241-242, defines this technique as “fragmental”.
42
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questions in the Warsaw Convention that are left to the national law of the forum (lex fori
principle):46 contributory negligence (Article 21); periodical payments of damages (Article 22,
paragraph 1); fault equivalent to willful misconduct (Article 25, paragraph 1); procedural
questions (Article 28, paragraph 2); method of calculating the period of limitation (Article 29,
paragraph 2).
2.4.1. Article 21: Contributory Negligence
A particularly relevant conflict rule is provided for by Article 21, according to which “if
the carrier proves that the damage was caused by or contributed to by the negligence of the
injured person the Court may, in accordance with the provisions of its own law, exonerate the
carrier wholly or partly from his liability”.
Generally, this Article permits the carrier to reduce its liability because of the
contributory negligence of the injured person. Thus, in case of damage, loss or delay in delivery
of goods (but also of personal injury and death of passengers), the carrier’s liability may be
limited or excluded, provided that the carrier is not guilty of willful misconduct under Article
25.47 What is relevant for our present analysis is the specific reference to the “provisions of its
own law”, meaning the law of the forum, in order to determine the extent of the contributory
negligence. The Warsaw Convention merely states the general rule that contributory negligence
of the plaintiff may limit or exclude carrier’s liability, but leaves to national laws to determine in
fact if and to what extent such limitation or exclusion will occur. The relevant law is the law of
the forum, namely the law of the court seized of the suit. Therefore, as far as contributory

46

It is believed that the reference to the law of the forum is generally limited to the substantive law and does not
include the conflict of laws rules of the forum, even though some authors suggest that such question should be
decided according to the text of the provisions and the circumstances. See Bentivoglio, supra note 12, at 128. For a
careful analysis of the question with specific reference to the carriage conventions see ANTONIO MALINTOPPI,
supra note 3, at 95, 202.
47
GOLDHIRSCH, supra note 30, at 117.
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negligence is concerned, “the court hearing a Warsaw case must apply its own law”48 to decide
how article 21 will be applied. Some authors, however, believe that the reference to the lex fori
is comprehensive of the conflict of laws rules as well; if it were, the applicable law would be not
necessarily the substantive law of the forum, but the law determined in accordance with conflict
rules of the forum.49
A question that may arise in federal countries, such as the Unites States, is what law is to
be applied: the national law or the law of a particular state? The need of uniformity and the
necessity to avoid forum shopping support the conclusion that national law (federal law) is
meant.50 It is nevertheless to be born in mind that Article 21 does not mean an absolute right for
the court to follow its own local law on the rules of contributory negligence when it contrasts to
the rules of the Warsaw Convention. For instance, it would be against the spirit and the purpose
of the Convention to completely exclude the carrier’s liability; particularly, it would be contrary
to the express provision of Article 23, according to which is prohibited to reduce the carrier’s
liability under the Convention.51 For the same reason it is forbidden to modify by contract
Article 21 “to absolve the carrier from all liability for the contributory negligence of the injured
person”52; such an agreement would be violative of Article 23, which prohibits any modification
of the provisions of the Convention. The carrier must prove the contributory negligence of the
person injured; this is valid “even in jurisdictions where the plaintiff must plead and prove his
freedom from contributory negligence in order to prevail”53. Thus, even if it is true that Article

48

Id.
HERBERT KRONKE, in MÜNCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUM HANDELSGESETZBUCH 2069 (1997).
50
GOLDHIRSCH, supra note 30, at 118.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id. at 119
49
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21 refers to the forum’s rules of contributory negligence, the Convention itself determines the
central issue of the burden of proof.
2.4.2. Article 22: Periodical Payments of Damages
The lex fori principle is also applicable under Article 22, which determines the limits of
carrier’s monetary liability, both for passengers and for goods. Pursuant to paragraph 1, “where,
in accordance with the law of the Court to which the case is submitted, damages may be awarded
in the form of periodical payments…”. The lex fori principle is therefore applicable in order to
award the injured person periodical payments. However, such reference to local law is limited to
damages to passengers and seems to be not applicable therefore to liability for goods.54
Paragraph 4 of the same Article 22, then, refers to lex fori “for awarding the whole or part of the
court costs and other expenses of the litigation incurred by the plaintiff”.55
2.4.3. Article 25: Fault Equivalent to Willful Misconduct
The lex fori principle is taken into account then by Article 25(1).

In drawing the

discipline of the carrier’s liability, this provision states that “the carrier shall not be entitled to
avail himself of the provisions of this Convention which exclude or limit his liability, if the
damage is caused by his willful misconduct or by such default on his part as, in accordance with
the law of the Court seised of the case, is considered to be equivalent to willful misconduct”.
The provisions referred to by Article 25 are in particular Article 20 (carrier relieved from any
liability if he proves he took all necessary measures to avoid the damage), Article 21 (carrier
permitted to offset a judgment if the claimant was guilty of contributory negligence), Article22
(carrier’s obligation to pay a judgment limited to the established values), Article 26 (carrier
entitled to timely written notice of damage or delay of registered goods and baggage), and

54
55

See Article 22(2).
Sadikov, supra note 43, at 242.
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Article 29 (a two-year statute of limitations applies to all actions not covered by Article 26).
What prohibits the carrier from exercising these rights is, primarily in first place, his being guilty
of willful misconduct. 56 The drafters of the Warsaw Convention were aware that several legal
systems consider also other kinds of subjective conduct as amounting to “willful misconduct”
and provide them with the same legal effects.57 The international legislator has preferred to
leave such evaluations to the national systems; thus, the Convention expressly states that the law
of the forum may be applied to judge the carrier’s conduct, which could be considered equivalent
to willful misconduct even if it cannot under a different local law.58
2.4.4. Article 28: Procedural Questions
Article 28 deals with the jurisdiction issue. Pursuant to this provision, “an action for
damages [under the Warsaw Convention] must be brought, at the option of the plaintiff, in the
territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, either before the Court having jurisdiction where
the carrier is ordinarily resident, or has his principal place of business, or has an establishment by
which the contract has been made or before the Court having jurisdiction at the place of
destination”.
Over the years, two more fora have been added: the Guadalajara Convention of 1961
added a forum for suits against the actual carrier (“the court having jurisdiction at the place
where the actual carrier is ordinarily resident or has its principal place of business”), and the
Guatemala Protocol of 1971 added a sixth jurisdiction, namely “the court within the same
jurisdiction of a carrier’s establishment if the passenger has a domicile or permanent residence in
56

“Willful misconduct” is defined in the Montreal Protocol No.4 as “an act or omission of the carrier, his servants or
agents, done with intent to cause damage or recklessly and with knowledge that damage would probably result”.
57
For an analysis of different approaches both in common law and civil law jurisdictions see GOLDHIRSCH, supra
note 30, at 152-154.
58
This can be particularly relevant in the practice, as a court will have to determine under its own law questions such
as whether an act can be considered “willful misconduct”, whether there is a causal link between act and damage,
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such jurisdiction”. Thus, a plaintiff has nowadays the option to bring a suit among six different
forums.
Of course such a choice is only a choice of forum and not a choice of the applicable law.
But, under Article 28(2), “questions of procedure shall be governed by the law of the Court
seised of the case”. Thus, by choosing a particular forum rather than another equally available,
the plaintiff chooses the procedural law of the suit as well. This means, for example, that the
local forum may determine under its own law such matters as “whether there has been adequate
service of papers, whether or not the claimant has properly invoked the subject matter
jurisdiction of the court, whether the claimant has legal capacity or whether it will refuse to
entertain the suit for other reasons”59 or the burden of proof. The court could for example
dismiss a suit on the grounds of forum non conveniens, but in this case it has to find another
competent forum under Article 28, since Article 32 prohibits the parties from altering “the rules
as to jurisdiction”.60 A question could arise for instance when a federal state is concerned. In this
case, the question becomes whether a suit may be brought in any court of the competent country
or whether it must be brought in a specific court within that country. The answer in the USA is
that “the forums (sic) listed in Article 28 refer to the national territory of a High Contracting

the degree of proof required to establish knowledge and the existence and extent of damages. See on this topic
GOLDHIRSCH, supra note 30, at 155.
59
Id. at 181
60
See the case Milor SRL v. British Airways Plc, reported on Times, February 19, 1996 and analyzed by Indira
Mahalingam Carr & Nicholas Grief, Forum Non Conveniens and the Warsaw Convention, J.B.L. 1996, Sep, 518523. In this case, defendants in a suit under the Warsaw Convention involving carrier’s liability for stolen goods
alleged that, after plaintiff’s choice of one of the possible fora, the competent court – in this case the High Court of
Justice in London – had the discretion to grant a stay on the ground of the doctrine of forum non conveniens in favor
of a different forum. The court ruled that the forum non conveniens doctrine was not applicable where the contract of
carriage was governed by the Warsaw Convention, which expressly gives the plaintiff a right of option among
several equally and available competent jurisdictions. Moreover, the court expressed the view that the Warsaw
Convention creates a self-contained code of jurisdiction, the intention being to harmonize different national views
on jurisdiction and it is implicit that the court of the chosen forum will remain seized of the matter and there is no
scope for the imposition of a venue which conflicts with the plaintiff’s choice. A different ruling would also favor
forum shopping.
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Party and not to political subdivisions within a particular High Contracting Party”.61 It therefore
logically follows that the relevant procedural law is the federal law and not the law of the state
where the suit is brought.
2.4.5. Article 29: Method of Calculating the Period of Limitation
The last specific applicable law provision to be addressed is Article 29, which sets forth a
two-year statute of limitations period in order to bring a suit for damages under the Convention,
either in contract or in tort.62 According to paragraph (2), “the method of calculating the period
of limitation shall be determined by the law of the Court seised of the case”. Thus, local law will
determine questions such as when an action can be considered “brought” in order to toll the
statute of limitations.63

2.5. Private International Law and Gap-Filling
The above analysis should prove that even a uniform law convention considering itself as
the only applicable discipline on a specific matter, as the Warsaw Convention, maintain a role
for the private international law. This role is actually quite limited, because the Convention itself
states not only the cases when a different law can be taken into account (internal gaps) but also
directly states which is the specific national law to be applied.

Such use of the private

international law is the subsidiary function of the private international law.
Is the subsidiary function the only one for the private international law in the case of the
Warsaw Convention? Of course there are issues related to international carriage by air that are
not covered by the Convention. For example, negotiability of the air waybill, persons who have

61

GOLDHIRSCH, supra note 30, at 178; see Mertens v. Flying Tiger Lines 9 Avi. 17187, 35 FRD 196 (D.C.N.Y.
1963) 352 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1965)
62
See GOLDHIRSCH, supra note 30, at 189.
63
Id. at 196.
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the right to sue, extent and calculation of recoverable damages,64 determination of all necessary
measures to avoid the damage under Article 20,65 or questions such as “overbooking,
cancellation of the contract of carriage, liability of the passenger vis-à-vis the carrier”.66 All
these external gaps are left to the otherwise applicable domestic law. This is the supplementary
function of the private international law.
Our analysis could actually stop at this point but it may be interesting to briefly touch the
question as to the proper domestic law to be applied. Following the solutions provided for by the
Convention as to specific issues, one might think that the lex fori would be a good general
approach. However, commentators have pointed out that the conflicts rules laid down in the
Convention are “of special character” and that the lex fori “is applied in private international law
as an exception only, for it allows the plaintiff to choose the substantive law and puts him in a
privileged position”.67 The most appropriate solution seems to be that national courts should
base their decision as to the applicable law on “the general principles of conflict of laws”.68
Therefore, the forum will apply its own conflict of laws rules and thus will determine the
applicable substantive law. The result could be that “the carriage will be governed to some
extent by the Warsaw provisions and, for the rest, by the law referred to by the usual rules of
conflicts”.69 Briefly, the first criterion is likely to be the party autonomy.70 In the absence of any
parties’ choice, it has been suggested that the law of the carrier (meaning the law of his principal

64

The local law will therefore determine what kind of damages are recoverable, whether only monetary or also nonpecuniary loss. For an analysis of the US situation, particularly in relation to the Death on the High Seas Act
(D.O.H.S.A.), see GOLDHIRSCH, supra note 30, at 76.
65
Bentivoglio, supra note 36, at 129
66
Sadikov, supra note 43, at 243.
67
Id.
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Id. at 244.
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Bentivoglio, supra note 36, at 130.
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Id. at 134.

21

place of business) should apply;71 other criteria are the law of the place where the contract was
made (lex loci contractus), the law of the place of performance of the contract (lex loci
executionis) and the law of the flag. A general and recognized need of predictability and
uniformity seems to suggest that the law of the carrier should be “granted the governing role” in
international carriage by air.72 However, it is easy to understand how the need for uniformity in
the carriage of goods by air is likely to be frustrated either by means of the subsidiary function of
the private international law and even more by means of an uncontrolled supplementary function
of the different conflict rules available to national courts.

2.6. Warsaw Convention and Forum Shopping
As already mentioned at the beginning of the present Chapter, the most violent critic to
the Warsaw Convention is the low limit of carrier’s liability. This is particularly true as far as
personal injuries are concerned. For example, in the 1970’s the maximum recoverable sum of
money amounted to $20,000 per passenger, whereas some national laws, in particular in the
United States, had already recognized much higher sums. The Warsaw Convention’s limit
seemed particularly inadequate in cases of large suits from plane disasters. The question arose in
the Parish air-crash case,

73

when a Turkish plane crashed near Paris, causing the death of 330

passengers from five different continents and of the 13-member crew.74 In order to avoid the
unfavorable damage limit of the Warsaw Convention (and the jurisdictional problems, which
under Article 28 of the Convention would have precluded a suit in the United States), some
plaintiffs decided to shift the suits to a federal court in the United States, recasting the airplane
71

Id. at 137.
See id. at 140.
73
In Re Paris Air Crash 339 F. Supp. 732 (D.C. Cal. 1975).
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crash as a product liability suit against the American aircraft manufacturer. The suit resulted
therefore in a tort action brought against the aircraft manufacturer and not against the carrier.
This made the Convention (with its low limit) “not subject to the rules of the Convention”.75

2.7. Conclusion
The Warsaw Convention is a typical model of international carriage of goods convention.
It lays down a uniform standard of liability for the carrier that may not be altered or derogated by
the parties: agreements made to modify the rules are “null and void” and automatically replaced
by the rules. The application of the uniform law is mandatory, consistently with the purpose to
internationally govern the carriage by air.76 Private international law plays therefore a very
limited role in the Warsaw Convention. There is no provision utilizing private international law
as a general means to deal with matters related to the field of carriage by air. The Convention
contained five provisions in which the substantive law of the forum governs specific issues. This
use of a direct applicable law provision, as we will see, is the basic starting point for a more
developed role of private international law in international substantive law conventions.
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Case’s analysis by Friedrich K. Juenger, Forum Shopping, Domestic and International, 63 TUL. L. REV. 553
(1989).
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CHAPTER 3
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTIONS ON THE CARRIAGE OF GOODS BY SEA
(HAMBURG RULES), 1978

3.1. Introduction
The Hamburg Rules represent the most recent international discipline of the contract of
carriage of goods by sea par excellence, i.e. the ocean bill of lading.77 However, the history of
the international harmonization of the carriage of goods by sea is much more ancient and the two
preceding uniform sets of rules still constitute valid and applicable law in certain situations. It
seems to be appropriate, therefore, to present a brief analysis of some aspects of such laws: the
1924 Hague Rules and the 1968 Hague/Visby Rules.

3.2. Historical Remarks
The bill of lading is the final result of a very ancient process in the development of
contracts for transportation of goods by sea, which goes back to the fourteen century.78 No
surprise, therefore, that the first attempts to lay down an international uniform regime of the bill
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The ocean bill of lading has been recognized to have at least three function: it is (i) a document of title of the
goods, (ii) a receipt of the cargo, (iii) the evidence of a contract of carriage; a general function is for the bill of
lading to constitute a documentation of the contract of carriage. See WILLIAM TETLEY, BILLS OF LADING AND
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS IN THE HAMBURG RULES: A CHOICE FOR THE E.E.C.?, at 51 (1994), and S. Braekus,
Choice of Law Problems in International Shipping, ACADEMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, RECUEIL DES
COURS, 251, 320 (1979 III), Tome 164. The bill of lading must be distinguished from another contract of
transportation of goods by sea, the charterparty, a contract by which a person (the charterer) wants the employment
of a ship for a voyage or for a specific duration of time.
78
TETLEY, supra note 77, at 50.
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of lading (as to form and content), especially in order to limit the risk for the carrier,79 were made
already in the nineteen century, precisely in the year 1864 with the York Rules, periodically
revised until 1877, and then in the year 1890 with the York-Antwerp Rules. The uniformity in
the carriage of goods by sea, however, was seriously threatened by the fact that the application of
such sets of rules was not mandatory. The subsequent bodies of rules (the Hague Rules and the
Hague/Visby Rules), on the contrary, were meant to be compulsory (at least to some extent), as
their applicability was not connected with the contractual autonomy of the parties.

3.3. Legal Effect of the Rules: from The Hague to Visby (or from The Vita Food
Products Case to The Morviken Case)
The Hague Rules (Brussels Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to
Bills of Lading, 1924) established a “minimum obligation to exercise due diligence to make a
ship seaworthy” on the part of the shipowners,80 a duty of care in carrying the goods during the
voyage and a limited liability regime for the carrier. These Rules were mandatory pursuant to
Article 3(8) and Article 10.81 For example, the English enactment of the Rules, the Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act (U.K. C.O.G.S.A.) 1924,82 provided that the Rules “shall have effect” in
relation to certain types of contracts for the carriage of goods by sea. However, since a clear
statement that the Rules had “force of law” was absent and since the bill of lading was required
to contain a paramount clause (i.e. an express statement that the Rules are to be applied), their
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For a general statement on the importance to have uniform and certain rules on the limitation of carrier’s risk as
the main reason to have international conventions on carriage of goods, see ANGELO PESCE, supra note 22 at 4.
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Id. at 110.
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According to Article 10, “the provisions of this convention shall apply to all bills of lading issued in any of the
contracting States”.
82
Even the Hamburg Rules, to be effective, have to be introduced in the domestic national legislation. Thus, the
Rules become “domestic” law and their effectiveness will depend on how the national courts apply them
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application has not always been considered as mandatory in the presence of a different choice of
law by the parties.
The (English) Privy Council, in the famous Vita Food Products decision,83 upheld a
choice of law contained in the bill of lading where the parties had agreed on the applicability of
English law. It was decided that the absence of a paramount clause invoking the compulsory
application of the Rules rendered valid a different choice of law made by the parties to the
transportation contract, with the consequence that the non-responsibility clauses contained in the
bill of lading, and contrary to the Rules, were held to be valid.84 In the Vita Food Products
decision, the court applied the classic conflict of laws principle of express choice by the parties
instead of recognizing the mandatory applicability of the Hague Rules, which were part to the
English law by virtue of the U.K. Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1924. According to the law, the
parties would have been prohibited under Article 3(8) from relieving or lessening the carrier’s
responsibility. Clearly, the Vita Food Products decision was not in accord with the goal of
international harmonization, which was the main purpose of the Rules.85
As a result of incongruity with the goal of harmonization, the new version of the Rules
amended by the Brussels Protocol, the Hague/Visby Rules of 1968, took a different approach.
No requirement of any paramount clause was included and it was expressly stated that the Rules
shall have force of law.86
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The Vita Food Products decision had been already opposed by some courts,87 but a clear
and firm position was taken only in the year 1983 in England by the House of Lords in the
Morviken decision.88 The Morviken court expressly rejected the Vita Food Products holding
and did not give any primacy to the parties’ choice of a national law (in the specific case, the
Dutch law) contained in the bill of lading. Since the Rules were applicable under Article 10, a
choice of law clause would result in a violation of Article 3(8), under which any attempt to
lessen the carrier’s liability as set out in the Rules is void. Therefore, the mandatory nature of
the Rules could not be evaded by the parties through a choice of law clause because such a
choice would have been contrary to public policy and mandatory provisions of law (specifically,
the 1971 English Carriage of Goods by Sea Act).
There is no doubt that the Morviken decision expresses the correct and accepted approach
to the Rules. As the Morviken court succinctly states, the Rules were “not conceived as a
comprehensive and self-sufficient code regulating the carriage of goods by sea”89 and were
designed only “to unify certain rules relating to bills of lading”; but, within their scope of
application, they were meant to be compulsory.90 As another court, in applying the Morviken
approach, has ruled, to give primacy to the intention of the parties “would enable the stated
purpose of the International Convention, viz. the unification of domestic laws of the contracting
states relating to bills of lading, to be evaded by the use of colourable devices that, not being
expressly referred to in the rules, are not specifically prohibited”.91
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3.4. The Hamburg Rules
The standardization of the rules on bill of lading and liability of the parties purported and
hoped by adopting the amended 1968 Hague Rules proved in the practice of business to be
illusory, so that the international maritime commercial community considered as necessary a
deep revision of the rules. Such efforts lead eventually to the UN Convention on the Carriage of
Goods by Sea (the Hamburg Rules) of 1978, in force since 1992, and intended to replace the two
precedent not satisfactory sets of rules.92
The Hamburg Rules are “not just an amendment” of the old rules, but “a totally new
cargo convention”,93 because they cover a broad ocean of topics, virtually the whole of law
concerning carriage of goods by sea, whereas the Hague Rules were limited only to rather
narrow objectives.94 What is important to notice is that, like the precedent Hague/Visby Rules,
the Hamburg Rules impose a mandatory, and also heavier, level of liability on carriers,95 and that
they reject a total “freedom of contract in favour of imposing minimum standards of liability on
shipowners”.96 In other words, the Hamburg Rules have been given force of law.
The enactment of the Hamburg Rules, however, canceled neither the Hague Rules nor the
Hague/Visby Rules, with the very uncomfortable consequence that businessmen and lawyers
have nowadays to deal with three different bodies of rules governing the international carriage of
goods by sea, which also means, for instance, nine different package and kilo disciplines. Of
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course, such stratification of conflicting uniform commercial law conventions is heavily contrary
to the general need of international uniformity and standard harmonization.97

3.5. Scope of application of the Hamburg Rules
The Hamburg Rules apply to all contracts of carriage of goods by sea, which are defined
in Article 1(6) as “any contract whereby the carrier undertakes against payment of freight to
carry goods by sea from one port to another”, regardless of whether a formal bill of lading is
issued.98

However, as the previous conventions provided, the Rules do not apply to

charterparties.99
The Convention covers only contracts of carriage of goods by sea between ports located
in two different States when one of the following five situations occurs: (a) the port of loading or
(b) the port of discharge as provided for in the contract is located in a Contracting State; (c) one
of the optional ports of discharge provided for in the contract is the actual port of discharge and
such port is located in a Contracting State; (d) the bill of lading or other document evidencing the
contract of carriage is issued in a Contracting States; (e) the bill of lading or other document
evidencing the contract provides that the Convention or the legislation of any State giving effect
to it is to govern the contract.
The above mentioned provision causes a significant enlargement of the scope of
application of the Hamburg Rules. Basically, when a transportation of goods by sea can be
defined as carriage according to Article 1(6) and at least one of the five objective elements of
internationality occurs, the Rules shall always apply. It is actually interesting to notice that here
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the scope of application is even larger than in the case of the Warsaw Convention governing the
carriage of goods by air. Under that convention, the applicability of the uniform law to the
contract depends only on the circumstance that the places relevant to the transportation (place of
departure, destination or stopping) are in different states and that at least one of them is a
contracting state. The Rules take into consideration also the circumstance that none of the places
involved in the transportation is located in a contracting state and consider as sufficient that (i)
the contract is issued in a contracting state, or (ii) the contract expressly refers to the Rules or to
the law of a contracting state. The final result is that any international carriage by sea anyway
linked to a state recognizing the Rules falls within their regime.

3.6. The Hamburg Rules as the Only Applicable Law
Once the Rules are in force in a given situation, they are the only applicable law.100
Articles 29 and 30 state that each of the Contracting States “shall apply the provisions of this
Convention” and that no reservations are permitted. Being the Rules mandatory, any different
choice of law by the parties is irrelevant. The Convention, in fact, allows no choice of law.101
This is also made clear by Article 23, pursuant to which “any stipulation in a contract of carriage
by sea, in a bill of loading, or in any other document evidencing the contract of carriage by sea is
null and void to the extent that it derogates, directly or indirectly, from the provisions of this
Convention”.102
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3.7. Applicable Law Provisions
The 1924 Hague Rules did not contain any conflict rules. That Convention was intended
to be mandatory within its scope of application,103 and the conflict of laws issue is not dealt with
in it. The 1968 Hague/Visby Rules had the same general approach, but contained a conflict rule
on a specific issue: they refer to the lex fori for the action for indemnity against a third person.104
The Hamburg Rules do not provide any general conflict of laws rule. As one author
noted, “the efforts of the drafters of this important legal instrument were aimed at achieving
unification of substantive law and not conflicts of laws”.105
Nevertheless, the Rules contain a few provisions that refer to a particular domestic law in
relation to specific issues.
3.7.1. Article 4
Article 4 defines the period of responsibility of the carrier for loss resulting from loss or
damage to the goods and from delay in delivery, which extends from the time when the carrier is
in charge of the goods at the port of lading until the time when he is in charge at the port of
discharge. In order to explain the meaning of these two moments, paragraph (2) states that the
carrier is deemed to be in charge of the goods (a) from the time he has taken over the goods from
the shipper or an authority or other third party to whom, pursuant to law or regulations
applicable at the port of loading, the goods must be handed over for shipment; (b) until the time
he has delivered the goods by handing over the goods to the consignee or, in cases where the
consignee does not receive the goods from the carrier, by placing them at the disposal of the
consignee in accordance with the contract or with the law or with the usage of the particular
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trade, applicable at the port of discharge, or by handing over the goods to an authority or other
third party to whom, pursuant to law or regulations applicable at the port of discharge, the
goods must be handed over. The law of two different states, therefore, could be relevant to
determine the exact and real extent of the carrier’s liability.
3.7.2. Article 14
Article 14 specifies that the signature on the bill of lading, which must be issued by the
carrier on demand of the shipper, may be in handwriting, printed or made by any other
mechanical or electronic means, if not inconsistent with the law of the country where the bill of
lading is issued.

Mandatory provisions on the legal effects of a signature are rendered

unavoidable by the Convention.
3.7.3. Article 20
Article 20 deals with the issue of the statute of limitations for actions relating to the
carriage of goods under the Convention. The general period of limitation is two years. However,
paragraph (5) considers a particular case: “an action for indemnity by a person held liable may be
instituted even after the expiration of the limitation period provided for in the preceding
paragraphs if instituted within the time allowed by the law of the State where proceedings are
instituted”.
3.7.4. Article 21
Article 21 deals with the important issue of jurisdiction. The Convention provides a
choice of forum for the plaintiff to bring action among six different fora (the place of business of
the carrier; the place where the contract was made; the port of loading; the port of discharge; the
agreed place in the contract; the place where the vessel has been arrested). Paragraph (1), in
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giving the plaintiff the option where to institute an action, specifies that the court chosen must be
competent “according to the law of the State where the court is situated”.
Of course, Article 21 does not deal directly with “the applicable law which governs the
contract of carriage”.106 This determination is to be made by the court seised of the case
according to Article 21, whether there is a choice of law by the parties or whether such a choice
is absent.

3.8. Carriage of Goods by Sea and Private International Law
The Hamburg Rules do not constitute a comprehensive discipline of the carriage of goods
by sea. Of course, when applicable, the Rules are the only governing law regarding the covered
matters but they not govern all aspects of a contract of carriage by sea.
A court dealing with a dispute on a transportation of goods by sea, therefore, could have
to adjudicate on some issues by applying the uniform rules and on other issues, not covered by
the Convention, according to the domestic substantive applicable law, which can be the same law
of the forum state (other than the statute in which the convention is enacted) or the domestic law
of a different state.107 The question, as always in similar cases, is how to determine the domestic
substantive applicable law.
General conflict rules in the field of the carriage of goods by sea are to be found in
national laws, judicial practice and regional international conventions. A brief overview on
some of these conflict rules may be useful.
As far as American law is concerned, the Restatement, Second, Conflict of Laws, Chapter
8, provides a special rule on transportation contracts. Pursuant to paragraph 197, the validity of a
106

CHRISTOF LÜDDEKE & ANDREW JOHNSON, THE HAMBURG RULES FROM HAGUE TO HAMBURG VIA
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contract of carriage of goods and the rights and obligations arising out of the resulting
contractual relationship, in the absence of a choice of law by the parties, are governed by (i) the
law of the State of dispatch of the goods or (ii) the law of any other State which has a more
significant relationship to the contract. Thus, the USA follows the common law doctrine of the
proper law of the contract, by giving priority to the intention of the parties and to the law most
closely connected with the contract.108
When a European Union country is involved, the 1980 Rome Convention on the Law
Applicable to Contractual Obligations becomes relevant.109. Pursuant to Article 4(1) of the
Convention, the contract shall be governed by the law of the country with which it is most
closely connected; it is generally presumed by the Convention “that the contract is most closely
connected with the country where the party who is to effect the performance which is
characteristic of the contract has, at the time of conclusion of the contract, his habitual residence,
or, in case of a body corporate or incorporate, its central administration”.110 In the case of
contract of carriage of goods, however, Article 4(4) sets forth a different presumption: the
applicable law shall be that of the country in which, at the time the contract is made, the carrier
has his principal place of business, provided that it is also the country in which the place of
loading, or the place of discharge, or the principal place of business of the consignor is situated.
Where, from the circumstances of the case, it appears that the contract is more closely connected
with another country, the specific presumption of paragraph 4 does not apply. However, as
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noticed by the scholarship, the carriage-of-goods presumption should cover the larger part of the
situations.111

3.9. Conclusion
The uniform rules on international carriage of goods by sea were always intended to be
mandatory.112 The apparent ambiguity of the 1924 Hague Rules, which caused the Vita Food
Products decision and was remedied in the Morviken case (based however on the 1968 version
of the Rules), is now resolved in the clear wording of the Hamburg Rules, under which every
agreement of the parties to modify the mandatory regime of liability for the carrier is “null and
void”. Like the Warsaw Convention, the Rules do not contain any general provisions on private
international law but only direct applicable law rules. However, the Rules use more than one
connecting factor to determine the substantive domestic law to be applied: not only the law of the
forum, but also the law of the port of loading, discharge and bill emission.
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CHAPTER 4
CONVENTION ON THE CONTRACT FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CARRIAGE OF
GOODS BY ROAD,
(CONVENTION DE MERCHANDISES PER ROUTE - CMR), 1956

4.1. Historical Remarks
The Convention on Contract for the International Carriage of Goods by Road (CMR),113
signed at Geneva on 19 May 1956, governs the international carriage by road in Europe. It was
drafted by the Economic Commission for Europe, an ONU organization. Its content, as it will
become clear in the following analysis, derives mainly from the CIM, the convention on
international carriage of goods by rail.

4.2. Scope of Application
According to Article 1, paragraph 1, the CMR “shall apply to every contract for the
carriage of goods by road in vehicles for reward, when the place of taking over of the goods and
the place designated for delivery, as specified in the contract, are situated in two different
countries, of which at least one is a contracting country, irrespective of the place of residence and
the nationality of the parties”.114
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The criterion to determine the internationality of the contract is objective: relevant is only
the fact that the places connected with the transportation (place of taking over and place of
delivery) are located in different states. For the applicability of the Convention, moreover, is
necessary but also sufficient that only one of these states has ratified the uniform law. The scope
of application of the CMR is therefore particularly broad, since it is applicable even to the
carriage by road with countries that are not parties to the Convention.115
The Convention also tries to extend its scope of application by requesting the parties to
include in the consignment note a paramount clause. According to Article 6(1)(k), the note must
contain a statement that the carriage is subject, notwithstanding any clause to the contrary, to the
uniform provisions. The incorporation of the CMR in the contract is intended to render the
Convention applicable even in a dispute before the courts of a non-contracting state.116 117

4.3. Legal Effect of the CMR
The main purpose of the CMR, “like other international conventions which regulate
contracts of carriage”,118 is to regulate uniformly the international carriage of goods by road,
especially by setting a standardized regime of carrier’s liability119 and by determining the
requisite of the carriage’s main document, namely the consignment note.120 An international
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contract of carriage necessarily involves more than one subject (the carrier, the consignor, the
consignee) and therefore more than one jurisdiction; an international uniform law has, or is
supposed, to overcome conflict of laws problems arising out from such a contractual
relationship.121
When the requirements of Article 1(1) are satisfied, the CMR is the only applicable law.
The forum may not resort to the normal national rules on conflict of laws and parties to an
international contract of carriage of goods by road may not exclude it or derogate from it. As
correctly pointed out by the scholarship, Article 1 is indeed a “unilateral conflicts rule in the lex
fori of a contracting state”.122
The necessary application of the CMR extends also to arbitration clauses. Article 33
states that “the contract of carriage may contain a clause conferring competence on an arbitration
tribunal if the clause conferring competence on the tribunal provides that the tribunal shall apply
this Convention”. On the one hand the parties are free to agree on an arbitration clause, on the
other hand this clause must specify that the tribunal is bound to apply the CMR123; otherwise,
“the clause will be of no effect” and the jurisdiction will be determined according to the rules set
forth in Article 31 for normal state courts.124

6(1)(k)); in the absence of such a statement, the carrier is liable for all expenses, loss and damage sustained through
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The Convention is clearly intended to be mandatory. According to Article 41, paragraph
1 (which clearly recalls Article 32 of the Warsaw Convention and Article 23 of the Hamburg
Rules), “any stipulation which would directly or indirectly derogate from the provisions of this
Convention shall be null and void”. This means that, “once CMR applies, Article 41 prohibits
the parties to a contract of carriage from writing into the contract any term which derogates from
the Convention. Thus, they cannot alter the rights and responsibilities set out in it”.125 The
obvious consequence is that “any contract purporting to do so is void to the extent, but only to
the extent, that is repugnant to the terms of the Convention”.126 According to this approach, for
example, Section 1 of the U.K. Carriage of Goods by Road Act of 1965 expressly states that the
CMR has force of law between the parties.127

4.4. Applicable Law Provisions in the CMR
As previously mentioned, CMR provisions have been strongly influenced by the then in
force text of CIM, namely the convention on carriage of goods by rail. However, differently
from this, the CMR does not contain a general conflicts rule but it only provides specific conflict
rules for specific issues which may arise in the event of an international carriage of goods by
road.128
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4.4.1. Lex Fori as a Connecting Factor
Our analysis of the CMR conflict rules will start with a connecting factor quite common
in international law conventions: the lex fori.129
According to Article 29, paragraph 1, the carrier’s liability, limited as a general rule, is
without limitations “if the damage was caused by his willful misconduct or by such default on
his part as, in accordance with the law of the court or tribunal seised of the case, is considered as
equivalent to willful misconduct”.

The determination on which kind of default can be

considered amounting to a willful misconduct is left to the lex fori.130 This reference to the
national law could have as a consequence that in some countries, such as Italy, Germany and
France, a particularly heavy fault (“colpa grave”, “große Fahrlässigkeit”, “faute lourde”) will be
considered equivalent to willful misconduct.131
Under Article 32 (dealing with the extension of the period of limitation), paragraph 3,
“the extension of the period of limitation shall be governed by the law of the court or tribunal
seized of the case. That law shall also govern the fresh accrual of rights of action”. Article 32
states that the period of limitation for an action arising out of an international contract of carriage
shall be normally of one year, in case of willful misconduct or equivalent default three years;
paragraph 2 regulates some aspects of the suspension. Subject to these provisions of paragraph
2, the extension of the period of limitation will be governed by the law of the court seized of the
case. This means that “any additional ground permitted by national law will also suspend the
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period of limitation”.132 For example, in England, when a period of limitation expires on Sunday
or on other day on which the court offices are closed, the next available day will become the last
valid day. This provision allows parties to extend by agreement the time limit when permitted
under the applicable law, provided that such agreements are made after a claim arises; if made
before, they would amount to derogations from the Convention, which are null and void under
Article 41.133 Paragraph 3 states also that the lex fori will govern the fresh accrual of rights of
action. Under English law, for instance, a claim can revive, once expired because of the running
out of the period of limitation, only by a “fresh contract to pay, which must be supported by its
own consideration” to be enforceable.134
4.4.2. Lex Loci Contractus as a Connecting Factor
A different connecting factor is used in Article 5, paragraph 1, which refers to the lex loci
contractus to regulate the signing of a consignment note, the crucial document of the carriage of
goods by road. This provision states that “signatures may be printed or replaced by the stamps of
the sender and the carrier if the law of the country in which the consignment note has been made
out so permits”.
4.4.3. Lex Rei Sitae as a Connecting Factor
Finally, the lex rei sitae is the connecting factor adopted by two other CMR provisions.
Article 16, paragraph 5, states that the procedure in the case of sale of the goods by the
carrier because of circumstances preventing the delivery, “shall be determined by the law or
custom of the place where the goods are situated”.
Article 20, paragraph 4, states that when the carrier has to deal with the goods in the
absence of instructions given by the owner of the goods, the carrier shall be entitled to deal with
132
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them in accordance with the law of the place where the goods are situated. Article 20 deals with
the issue of the consequences of a definite delay in delivery. If the goods are not delivered
within thirty days following the expiry of the agreed time-limit or within sixty days from the
time the carrier accepts the goods for shipment, the person entitled to make a claim may consider
the goods as lost (paragraph 1); the person entitled may also request the carrier in writing that he
shall be notified if the goods are recovered within a year from the time when the compensation
for the lost goods has been paid. Paragraph 4, relevant in our analysis, address the problem of
how the carrier has to deal with the cargo if he recovers the lost goods after the time limit set
forth in paragraph 1 has expired but does not receive any request or instruction from the person
entitled. Thus, if the person entitled fails to send a written request under paragraph 2 or to give
instruction within the time limit specified under paragraph 3 or if the goods are not recovered
until more than one year after the payment of compensation, then the carrier can deal with the
goods in any way in accordance with the lex rei sitae.
4.4.4. Generic Reference to the “Law Applicable”
A generic reference to the otherwise applicable law can be found in Article 28, pursuant
to which “in cases where, under the law applicable, loss, damage or delay arising out of carriage
under this Convention gives rise to an extra-contractual claim, the carrier may avail himself of
the provisions of this Convention which exclude his liability or which fix or limit the
compensation due”. This provision is better understood by recovering Article 1, paragraph 1,
which refers only to “contracts for the carriage of goods”. A non-contractual claim would
clearly be outside the scope of application ratione materiae of the CMR, so that this particular
provision is intended to deal with the event that a certain applicable national law lays down a
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“non-contractual right of action”.135 The importance of the present provision is that, especially
under common law, the framing of an action in contract or in tort will determine a different
amount recoverable.136 Article 28 influences the local law by making applicable for the carrier
the uniform favorable provisions of the CMR. However, Article 28 is not an applicable law
provision; no domestic law is made applicable through it, but it only considers the case in which
a contractual claim under the Convention is also considered as extra-contractual by a particular
domestic law. In such a case, the Convention extends its discipline on carrier’s liability to this
domestic tort law.

4.5. Gaps in the CMR
The CMR, like other international uniform laws, “is not a complete and self-contained
code”137 and “was never intended to contain an exhaustive system of regulations for the transport
contracts coming within its scope and it was always presumed that national laws and regulations
are to apply whenever there are no relevant provisions in the Convention”.138 It seems to be
correct, therefore, that relevant provisions of national law should be used to fill the inevitable
external gaps.139
For example, it has been written by English commentators that in case of gaps “a court
will have to turn to English law to deal with the point provided that English law is the proper law
of the contract. Thus if an issue is not governed by CMR an English court will normally apply
135
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common law or the provisions of the contract”.140 Again, some leading authors affirm that when
the Convention does not offer any guidance on matters related to contract of carriage, “the better
view would seem to be that the answer can only be sought in the national law”.141
As far as the case law is concerned, in the English decision Eastern Kayam Carpets Ltd.
v. Eastern United Freight Ltd.,142 the common law was applied to establish the carrier’s liability
as the judge found that CMR did not regulate the issue. In a widely cited German case,143
national law was applied to decide on the failure of the carrier to collect the goods. Finally, as a
Dutch court stated, with respect to the issue of the person responsible for loading goods, “if and
to the extent that the CMR is silent and a reply must be given to questions about the liability of
the carrier arising in such a case, one must apply the rules of national law applicable on the basis
of private international law”.144 It can therefore be agreed on the statement that, below the
uniform foundation set forth by the CMR, remains “the substratum of existing national law” to
provide support.145
Among the notable issues to which courts have applied national law, it is also interesting
to cite the following: 1) allocation of the duty of loading and unloading; 2) determination of the
meaning of some key words, such as “goods”, “reasonable time”, “ordinary residence” in order
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to determine the jurisdiction; 3) liability for expenses in consequence of the breach of implied
duties; 4) loss of or damage to goods which occurs outside of the time and space limits drawn by
Article 17; and 5) fundamentals of the law of contracts, such as conclusion, misrepresentation,
duress and non-enforceability.146
A subsequent question concerns which domestic law is to be applied in the absence of
uniform provisions or of conflict rules contained in the Convention. For example, Article 13 of
the CMR states that the consignee is entitled to damages for the loss of goods, but does not say
anything about damage to the goods. How to fill in the gap? Of course, as we have already seen,
an immediate answer is that national law is applicable. But which national law? How to identify
the national law to be applied? First, a court seized of a case on international carriage of goods
by road has to look for special conflict rules in the field concerned. In the absence of such rules,
a court will look at its own general conflict of law rules, i.e. the conflict law of the forum. The
connecting factor can be different from country to country: (i) the law of the carrier (lex
portitoris); (ii) the law of the state where the contract of carriage (note of consignment) was
made (lex loci contractus), as easy to identify and unique to the particular contract; or (iii) the lex
fori, a common connecting factor especially when coinciding with the law of the place of
performance or the law of the place of destination.147 In addition, it is important not to forget
about the law expressly or implicitly chosen by the parties, where the parties’ autonomy is
recognized as a connecting factor by the conflict rules of the forum (for example, in England).
Within the European Union, where is in force the text of the Rome Convention of 1980 on
the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, a court – in the absence of a parties’ choice of
law –would apply the proper law of the contract (lex causae), meaning the law of the state with
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the closest connection with the contract of carriage.148 Such law will be, very likely, the law of
the carrier, who is the party to the contract of carriage that performs the characteristic service.
More specifically, Article 4.4 of the Rome Convention states that “if the country in which, at the
time the contract is concluded, the carrier has his principal place of business is also the country
in which the place of loading or the place of discharge or the principal place of business of the
sender is situated, it shall be presumed that the contract is most closely connected with that
country”.

4.6. Conclusion
The CMR is a mandatory body of rules that does not admit any derogation by the parties
in the matters falling within its scope of application.149 Like other previously analyzed uniform
laws (Warsaw Convention and Hamburg Rules), it does not contain any general provision
dealing with private international law. It contains, however, several applicable law provisions
which directly lead to a particular national law. In the case of gaps, on the contrary, we have
seen that there is no a clear answer on which law is to be applied. This is probably the reason
why an author has said that development in the unification of conflict rules “could facilitate both
the legal position of owners of the goods and the process of settling conflicts problems arising
during the carriage of goods by road”.150
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CHAPTER 5
UNIFORM RULES CONCERNING THE CONTRACT FOR INTERNATIONAL CARRIAGE
OF GOODS BY RAIL
(CONVENTION INTERNATIONALE DE MERCHANDISE - CIM), 1980

5.1. Historical Remarks
The international carriage of goods, passengers and luggage by rail is governed by the
Convention Concerning International Carriage by Rail (COTIF). The uniform rules specifically
concerning the contract for international carriage of goods by rail are contained in the CIM, the
abbreviation for the part of the Convention exclusively dealing with the carriage of goods, which
is the subject of the present chapter (the provisions dealing with the carriage of passengers and
luggage are contained in another part of the COTIF, known as “CIV”).
The version of the CIM currently in force is the most recent result of a series of
conventions governing the field of the carriage by rail, which goes back to the first CIM
Convention in the year 1890. The CIM rules, being the first uniform set of rules on international
carriage of goods, served also as a model for other conventions, like the CMR Convention on the
carriage of goods by road.151
The 1980 Convention concerning International Carriage by Rail entered into force on 1
May 1985.
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5.2. Scope of Application
Under Article 1, the CIM applies to “all consignments of goods for carriage under a
through consignment note made out for a route over the territories of at least two States and
exclusively over lines or services included in the list provided for in Articles 3 and 10 of the
Convention”, which means the list maintained by the Central Office for International Carriage by
Rail in Bern (Switzerland).
The carriage is, therefore, considered “international” and subject to the Convention when
(i) the goods are being carried over the territories of at least two different states and (ii) such
states are included in the list. However, Article 2 specifies that “consignment between sending
and destination stations situated in the territory of the same State, which pass through the
territory of another State only in transit, shall not be subject to the Uniform Rules”. The carriage
must be, therefore, a real international transportation from one (listed) state to another (listed)
state.152
As far as the scope of application ratione materiae is concerned, Article 3 states the
obligation for the railway to carry any goods presented to it when certain conditions are met.
Some limitations are provided for by Article 4 and Article 5. The former identifies some articles
as not acceptable for carriage: (a) articles the carriage of which is prohibited in any one of the
territories in which the articles would be carried; (b) articles the carriage of which is a monopoly
of postal authorities; (c) articles which are not suitable for carriage by reason of dimension,
mass, weight etc.; (d) articles not acceptable under the Regulations concerning the international
carriage of dangerous goods by rail. The latter identifies articles which are acceptable for
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GLASS & CASHMORE, supra note 27, at 140.
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carriage only subject to certain conditions. Basically, it is about dangerous goods, funeral
consignments, railway rolling stock running on its own wheels, live animals, consignments the
carriage of which presents special difficulties by reason of their dimension, their mass or their
packaging.

5.3. Railway’s Liability Regime
Like other international carriage of goods conventions, the most significant part of the
CIM Rules contains a discipline for the documentation of the carriage (the consignment note)
and for the carrier’s liability.
According to Article 11, “the contract of carriage shall come into existence as soon as the
forwarding railway has accepted the goods for carriage together with the consignment note”.
Therefore, the consignment note is fundamental for the formation, and as evidence of the
validity, of an international contract under the CIM. The consignment note must be presented to
the railway by the consignor and will travel with the goods (Article 12). Article 13 states then
that the consignment note must contain certain information, such as the name of the destination
station, the names and addresses of the consignor and consignee, the description of the goods,
weight and number of packages, a list of documents, the number of wagons. Furthermore,
pursuant to Article 11(3), the consignment note shall be evidence of the making and content of
the contract.
An essential part of the CIM, like of any carriage-of-goods convention, is Title IV,
dealing with the carrier’s liability regime. The basic rule is set forth in Article 35, according to
which: “the railway which has accepted goods for carriage with the consignment note shall be
responsible for the carriage over the entire route up to delivery”. Article 36 specifies the extent
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of the liability, by stating that the railways is liable for loss or damage to the goods between the
time of acceptance for carriage and the time of delivery and for the loss or damage resulting from
the transit period being exceeded.
The CIM states two sets of defenses for the carrier. According to Article 36(2), the
railway is relieved of liability if loss or damage are caused by (i) a fault on the part of the person
entitled; (ii) by an order given by the person entitled otherwise than as a result of a fault on the
part of the railway; (iii) by inherent vice of the goods (decay, wastage, etc.), or (iv) by
circumstances which the railway could not avoid and the consequences of which it was unable to
prevent. Then, Article 36(3) provides the railway with a defense against liability when loss or
damage arises from the special risks inherent in certain circumstances, such as: (i) carriage in
open wagon; (ii) absence or inadequacy of packing; (iii)loading operations carried out by the
consignor or unloading operations carried out by the consignee; (iv) defective loading; (v)
completion by the consignor, the consignee or an agent of either, of the formalities required by
Customs or other administrative authorities; (vi) the nature of certain goods which renders them
inherently liable to total or partial loss; (vii) or damage, irregular, incorrect or incomplete
description of articles not acceptable for carriage or acceptable subject to conditions; (viii)
carriage of live animals; (ix) carriage which must be accompanied by an attendant. The Title on
liability is completed by Articles 37, dealing with the burden of proof, and Article 40, dealing
with the compensation for loss.

5.4. CIM as a Mandatory Law
When a carriage of goods by rail is international in the meaning of Article 1(1), the CIM
is the only applicable law and the parties may not derogate from it. This is made clear by Article
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9(1), under which “two or more States or two or more railways may make supplementary
provisions for the execution of the Uniform Rules. They may not derogate from the Uniform
Rules unless the latter expressly so provide”.

The CIM only allows the making of

“supplementary” provisions either by States or by railways, but it is forbidden any derogation
that is not provided by the CIM itself. In other words, the uniform regime concerning formation,
execution and modification of the contract of carriage, liability and of the assertion of rights set
forth by the CIM may not be altered.

5.5. The Gap-Filling Rule: “National Law” Defined
The CIM is the first convention on international carriage that expressly takes into account
the gap issue and provides for a general criterion to deal with it. Article 10(1) states that “in the
absence of provisions in the Uniform Rules, supplementary provisions or international tariffs,
national law shall apply”.
Thus, the CIM makes clear that national law is the gap-filling rule to be followed and in
Paragraph 2 also specifies that “national law” means the law of the State in which the person
entitled asserts his rights, including the rules relating to conflict of laws. This last specification
is important. After stating a special conflict of laws rule to be applied to fill in the gaps, Article
10 determines that “national law” includes, under this Convention, also the national rules on
conflict of laws. This excludes, of course only with regard to the present Convention, every
possible doctrinal or judicial dispute on what the reference to “national law” in uniform
conventions means. A gap is therefore to be filled in not necessarily by the substantive law of
the “State in which the person entitled asserts his rights”, but by the law determined by the
conflict of laws rules of this state, which could be the law of a third State.
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5.6. Specific Applicable Law Provisions
After using the lex fori as a conflict rule “of a general character”,153 the CIM establishes
special conflict rules for specific questions possibly arising in relation with contracts of carriage
by rail.
5.6.1. Lex Loci Contractus
Some issues are dealt with by using the lex loci contractus as a connecting factor. The
CIM language speaks of “laws and regulations in force at the forwarding station”. For example,
according to Article 13(1), “the provisions in force at the forwarding station shall determine the
meanings of the terms “wagon load” and “less than wagon load” for the whole of the route”,
terms which are used in the wording of the consignment note.

Similarly, Article 20 in

paragraphs (1) and (2), states that “the handing over of goods for carriage shall be governed by
the provisions in force at the forwarding station” and that “loading shall be the duty of the
railway or the consignor according to the provisions in force at the forwarding station”.
5.6.2. Lex Loci Solutionis
A different connecting factor (lex loci solutionis) is used by Article 28, paragraph 6,
which states that “delivery of goods shall be carried out in accordance with the provisions in
force at the destination station” in all other respects than those set forth in the previous five
paragraphs.
5.6.3. Lex Rei Sitae
Then, Article 33, paragraph 6, refers to the lex rei sitae: “if the consignor, on being
notified of circumstances preventing carriage, fails go give the necessary instructions, the
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railway shall take action in accordance with the provisions relating to circumstances preventing
delivery, in force at the place where the goods have been held up”.
5.6.4. Other Specific Provisions
Again, under Article 39, paragraph 4, in the absence of a request or instructions from the
person entitled, the railway that recovers goods supposedly lost “shall dispose of them in
accordance with the laws and regulations of the State having jurisdiction over the railway”.
The CIM refers to local law also in Article 52, dealing with “Ascertainment of partial loss
or damage” to the goods. Paragraph (1) states that the railway must draw up a report containing
all the possible information (condition, mass, extent of loss or damage, cause and time of
occurrence) in case of partial loss of, or damage to goods. If the person entitled does not accept
the findings contained in the report prepared by the railway, Paragraph (2) states that “he may
request that the condition and mass of the goods and the cause and amount of the loss or damage
be ascertained by an expert appointed either by the parties or by a court. The procedure to be
followed shall be governed by the laws and regulations of the State in which such ascertainment
takes place”. In this particular case, the CIM refers only to the procedural local law and
determines that the applicable law is that of the State where loss of or damage to the goods is to
be ascertained. Since paragraph (1) of Article 52 says that the report must be drawn up when
loss or damage “is discovered or presumed by the railway or alleged by the person entitled”, the
applicable law is very likely to be the law of the place of the final destination of the goods in the
latter case (allegation by the person entitled), the same place or an intermediate place in the
former (discovery or presumption by the railways).

153

Sadikov, supra note 43, at 218. The provisions referring to the national lex fori (meaning the national law of the
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defined as “renvoi” provisions by ANTONIO MALINTOPPI, supra note 3, at 198.
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Drawing the discipline of the “Limitation of action”, Article 58 states that the general
period of limitation for an action arising out from the contract of carriage by railway “shall be
one year”; in specific situations, listed in the same paragraph (1)(a) to (e), two years. Paragraph
(5), then, states that “the suspension and interruption of periods of limitation shall be governed
by national law”. Recalling Article 10(2)’s definition, “national law” is the law of the competent
forum, including the rules relating to conflict of laws.
The system of conflict of laws rules for carriage of goods by rail is complex but also
particularly accurate as takes into account “peculiarities of different transport operations
performed during the carriage”.154

5.7. Conclusion
The CIM is the most recent carriage-of-goods convention analyzed in this paper. Like
the other uniform laws, it is meant to be mandatory.155 It also provides several applicable law
provisions which directly lead to the domestic law governing specific issues. Moreover, it is the
first convention that expressly deals with the gap issue, by stating a general indirect conflict rule.
Thus, issues not covered by the Convention itself are to be dealt with through the national law of
the forum, including – quite unusually – its private international law provision. It means,
therefore, that the substantive governing law can be either the law of the forum itself or the law
of a third state; the CIM here merely states how to find the governing law, it does not directly
states – like every convention before did – the applicable law.
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CHAPTER 6
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS
FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS
(CISG), 1980

6.1. Historical Remarks
The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods
(CISG)156 has been drafted by the UNCITRAL and signed in Vienna in 1980.157 The previous
uniform regime for international sales was contained in the two Hague Conventions of 1964, the
Uniform Law on International Sales of Goods (ULIS) and the Uniform Law on the Formation of
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (ULF); however, the previous regime did not enjoy
the anticipated success.158

The purpose of the CISG is to set a uniform discipline for

international contracts for sale of goods by providing rules on the formation of the contract and
on the obligations of the parties. Unlike carriage of goods conventions, this discipline is not
intended to be exclusive and mandatory, but only a common basis on which the parties can build
their own statute by using their private autonomy. Therefore, the CISG has no force of law with
respect to the parties, but only supports the parties in crafting contracts to meet their specific
needs.
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For an updated list of CISG contracting states, refer to http://www.uncitral.org.
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6.2. Scope of Application
According to Article 1, the CISG applies to contracts of sale of goods between parties
whose place of business are located in different states (international sales) when the States are
Contracting States (Article 1(1)(a)) or when the rules of private international law of the forum
lead to the application of the law of a Contracting State (Article 1(1)(b)).159 This is the main
provision dealing with the CISG sphere of application (applicability rationae loci). Others
provisions deal with the applicability rationae materiae. Article 2 states that the CISG does not
apply to certain kinds of sales (goods bought for personal use, consumer purchases, sales by
auction etc.); Article 3 sets forth when a contract for the supply of goods to be manufactured or
produced is to be considered a sale or a contract for services, which is outside the CISG’s scope.
Article 4 and Article 5, which will be further analyzed later, expressly state to which matters the
CISG does not apply, leaving open the question on what law governs.
Some brief comments are necessary on Article 1’s two criteria of application. Article
1(1)(a) does not present too many problems. When the parties to an international contract of sale
have their place of business in two different contracting States, then the CISG does apply, unless
there is an agreement to exclude it under Article 6. The mere fact that, for example, the contract
has been signed in a non-contracting State and has to be performed in that State, does not
undermine the applicability of the CISG under Article 1(1)(a) in any forum located in a
contracting State: even if the rules of private international law would lead to the law of the noncontracting State, the Convention will apply anyway.160
More problematic is the applicability under Article 1(1)(b). A complete analysis of this
topic is beyond the scope of this paper and is unnecessary for the purposes of our analysis;
159

The USA, by exercise of the Article 95 reservation, is not bound by Article 1(1)(b).
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nevertheless, a few comments on this issue are appropriate at this juncture. The reference to the
rule of private international law of the forum may have the effect to render the Convention
applicable even if both parties have their place of business in non-contracting States, when the
conflict rules lead to the law of a third contracting state.161
The CISG itself limits its scope of application rationae materiae. According to Article 4,
the Convention is not concerned with (a) the validity of the contract or of any of its provisions or
of any usage and (b) the effect which the contract may have on the property in the goods sold.162
Thus, questions such as lack of legal capacity, misrepresentation and lack of due care,163 duress,
mistake, unconscionability, public policy, validity of standard terms, validity of choice of forum
clauses are left to the otherwise applicable local law, namely the domestic law as determined
according to general rules of conflict of laws.164
Article 5 states that the CISG does not apply to the liability of the seller for death or
personal injury caused by the goods to any person.165 These matters are governed by the
applicable domestic law, as determined by the conflict rules of the forum; since normally the
claim for personal injury falls within tort law, “the applicable law is essentially the law of the
place where the damage occurred”.166 If, however, the claim is based on contract law, the
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applicable law will be the proper law of the contract, meaning the law which would apply to the
contract in the absence of the CISG.167 On the other hand, damages caused by defective goods to
other goods or property are within the scope of the Convention.168

6.3. Party Autonomy (Article 6)
A central provision of the CISG is Article 6, pursuant to which “the parties may exclude
the application of this Convention or, subject to article 12, derogate from or vary the effect of
any of its provisions”.169
Unlike the carriage of goods conventions previously analyzed in this paper, the CISG has
no force of law and its provisions are not mandatory to the parties.170

The uniform law

recognizes party autonomy as a general principle171 and therefore it necessarily plays the role of
supplementary material, applicable only if and to the extent that the parties do not choose a
different statute for the contract of sale.172 The only exception to the parties’ right to derogate
from the CISG is Article 12, which states that the freedom of form principle set forth in Article
11 “does not apply where any party has his place of business in a Contracting State which has
made a declaration under Article 96”, which in effect gives a correspondent reservation power to
the contracting states.
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Parties’ right under Article 6 to exclude the convention in its entirety, even if all the
requirements for its applicability do occur, “is an application of a generally recognized principle
of private international law, according to which the parties to an international contract of sale of
goods are permitted to choose the applicable law”.173 For example, the 1986 Hague Convention
on the Law Applicable to Contracts for the International Sale of Goods states in Article 7 that “ a
contract of sale is governed by the law chosen by the parties”; the 1980 Rome Convention on the
Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations similarly says in Article 3 that “the contract shall be
governed by the law chosen by the parties”.
6.3.1. Express exclusion with or without choice of the applicable law
The CISG does not determine how the parties to an international sale can or must
exclude, or derogate from, the applicable uniform law.174
Of course there is no problem when parties expressly agree on the total or partial
exclusion of the CISG. However, the problem is which law will govern the contract instead of
the CISG. Two situations are here possible. If the parties do not choose any different law to
replace the excluded CISG, the applicable domestic law must be determined in accordance to the
conflict of laws rules of the forum;175 but if these rules lead to the law of a Contracting State, the
“non-uniform, domestic sales law of that State governs the contract”.176 On the other hand, if the
parties while excluding the CISG have made a choice of the applicable non-uniform law, this law
will govern the contract, provided that such a choice is valid under the law of the forum.177
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6.3.2. Implicit exclusion
Beside express exclusion, it is possible that the parties’ intention not to apply the CISG
remains implied but still recognizable. Even if there is no provision in the CISG allowing such a
form of exclusion, there is no doubt about its validity.178 But it is necessary that the parties
indicate clearly, even though not expressly, their intention. To recognize such an intention is not
always easy, but both doctrine and case law have recognized some typical situations. For
example, the choice of the law of a contracting State is not considered to amount to an exclusion
of the uniform law, because the CISG has become part of the national domestic law for
international sales in the contracting States.179 Thus, in order to exclude the Convention, the
parties must “clearly indicate that they intend to choose the law governing domestic sales as a
proper law of the contract”.180 On the other hand, an agreement on the application of the law of
a non-contracting State will usually amount to an implied exclusion of the convention.181 Other
ways to exclude implicitly the Convention have been identified in the use of general conditions
or standard form contracts “whose content is influenced by principles and rules typical of the
domestic law of a particular State”,182 even if in this last case other circumstances have to be
evaluated in order to ascertain the parties’ intent (e.g., the parties’ actual knowledge of the
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existence of the Convention, the use of the same general conditions or standard forms in previous
transactions, and the choice of a forum located in a non-contracting State).
Another issue is to be addressed: under which law is to be judged the validity of the
exclusion or of the derogation? The question has to be solved by reference to a particular
domestic law: either the law that would govern the contract in the absence of the convention or
the law chosen by the parties as the proper law of the contract. Of course the possibility to
choose a particular law depends on the rules of private international law of the forum.183

6.4. Applicable Law Provisions
Pursuant to Article 28, “if, in accordance with the provisions of this Convention, one
party is entitled to require performance of any obligation by the other party, a court is not bound
to enter a judgment for specific performance unless the court would do so under its own law in
respect of similar contracts of sale not governed by this Convention”. Article 28 is clearly a
conflict of laws rule, one of the very few of the CISG.184
For a better understanding of this provision, it is necessary to recall briefly the CISG
scheme in case of a breach of contract by the parties. The main obligations of the parties are: for
the seller, the delivery of the goods, the handing over of documents and the transfer of the
property in the goods (Article 30); for the buyer, the taking delivery of the goods and the
payment of the contract price. Article 45 (for seller’s breach) and Article 61 (for buyer’s breach)
determine the remedies available to the parties. Basically, the buyer has the right to require
performance, to declare the contract avoided, to reduce the price, and to claim damages. The
seller may require performance, declare the contract avoided or claim damages. In essence, the
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promisee “may either require the promisor to perform the underlying obligation or he may claim
damages on account of the failure to perform”185.
The promisee has the right to require performance as soon as the obligation becomes due
by the promisor;186 even when the promisee could declare the contract avoided,187 he may still
insist on performance. In both situations, the promisee has the right to claim damages under
Article 74.
The CISG follows the civil law approach, which favors specific performance as the
general remedial rule and considers the right to claim damages only as a secondary remedy.188
The common law approach, which considers specific performance only as an exceptional remedy
in case of a special interest of the promisee (commercial uniqueness), is disregarded.189
Article 28 is understandable in this context: it is a compromise between the civil law and
common law views on remedies for failure to perform,190 even if commentators from both sides
stress the fact that the practice is quite close.191 On the one hand the promisee has a right to
require performance under the CISG, on the other hand the enforceability of this right does not
depend on the Convention but on a particular local law: the lex fori.

Thus, “Courts of

Contracting States which grant specific performance only as an exceptional remedy are not

185

SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note 164, at 198.
See Article 46(1) for the buyer and Article 62 for the seller.
187
See Article 49 and Article 64.
188
SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note 164, at 199; the same view is expressed by BIANCA & BONELL, supra note 162,
at 232 (“Specific performance is granted only exceptionally at the court’s discretion as an equitable relief”).
189
See for example UCC 2-716(1): “specific performance may be decreed where the goods are unique or in other
proper circumstances”. See SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note 164, at 200: “…it is considered to be preferable and more
reasonable in economic terms to liquidate the contract rather than to compel the promisor to perform”.
190
SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note 164, at 200; speak of compromise also BIANCA & BONELL, supra note 162, at
236.
191
According to HONNOLD, supra note 160, at 277, even if the remedy of specific performance is more used in
civil law jurisdiction, for reasons of efficiency “remedies to coerce performance are seldom employed even in
domestic commerce”. BIANCA & BONELL, supra note 162, at 233 say that the practical difference is small, because
“the difficulties and delays in obtaining the very goods contracted for will in most cases<discourage the aggrieved
party from suing for specific performance” in civil law systems. See also ENDERLEIN & MASKOW, supra note 164,
at 121.
186

62

required to alter fundamental principles of their judicial procedure”.192

There is a broad

agreement on the point that the purpose of Article 28 is to give common law courts the
possibility to refuse specific performance when it would be against “basic common law
principles”.193

The Convention on this point seems to accept the common law view that

distinguishes between obligation and remedy for its nonperformance, between ascertainment of a
right (under the uniform provisions) and its enforceability (left to the national law of the
forum).194
Thus, under Article 28, a court seised of a case where the promisee brings an action for
specific performance must dispose of the in the same manner as it “would do so under its own
law in respect of similar contracts of sale”.195
The reference to the court’s “own law” deserves some analysis.

As a prominent

commentator correctly pointed out, “usually questions outside the scope of the CISG are
governed by the domestic rules of the jurisdiction that is selected by principles of private
international law”.196 In applying this provision, the problem arises whether Article 28 refers
immediately to the domestic law of the forum or to the law applicable under rules of private
international law of the forum. A practical example may be useful at this juncture. Suppose
State X is the forum for an international sale between two parties having their place of business
in States X and Y; assuming that the Convention is applicable, the issue is then whether Article
28 refers to the whole law of State X, including its rules of private international law that might
invoke the rules on specific performance of State Y? Writers agree on the point that the
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expression “own law” means the “domestic law of the forum state, excluding its private
international law”.197 Therefore, a court must only look at the law of the forum, just as it had to
deal with a national contract; the court must not apply its own conflict of laws rules and verify
whether the law of the forum “would have been applicable if the contract had not been subject to
the Convention”.198 A different law constituting the statute of the contract is irrelevant.
So, where the substantive law of the forum allows in the particular situation the specific
performance of the promisor’s obligation, then the court will enforce the promisee’s action; “the
court is not to decide the matter as it would if there were no Uniform Sales Law, but as it would
under its own law”.199 A consequence of this mechanism is that an agreement between the
parties in favor of specific performance, in theory valid under Article 6, will not bound a court
whose law does not provide such a remedy for similar national contracts.200
In practice and generally speaking, a civil law court is very likely to permit an action
claiming specific performance, whereas a common law court is as much as likely to dismiss such
an action (since damages are considered an adequate remedy in most instances). In the U.K.,
under the Sales of Goods Act 1893, a court may enter a judgment or decree for the specific
performance of contract “to deliver specific or ascertained goods”, whereas generic goods seem
to be out of this provision. The action to compel delivery under the Uniform Commercial Code
is less strict and allows specific performance “where the goods are unique or in other proper
circumstances”. As far as the seller’s action to recover the price is concerned, UCC 2-709(1)(b)
provides that the seller may recover the price “of goods identified to the contract if the seller is
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unable after reasonable effort to resell them at a reasonable price or the circumstances reasonably
indicate that such effort will be unavailing”.
According to a leading commentary, a court does not have any discretion in entering a
judgment for specific performance: when the lex fori does not give the judge the power to enter a
judgment for specific performance, there is no room for him to grant such a remedy on other
grounds, for example the internationality of the contract.201 Since Article 28 is a conflict rule,
once a particular national law becomes applicable, it must be applied; the only discretion allowed
is that granted under national law, Article 28 does not add anything more. This strict position is
not shared by another leading commentary, according to which the wording “the court is not
bound to do so” would mean that “nothing prevents it from entering a judgment for specific
performance in cases in which formerly it refused to do so”.202 Thus, common law courts might
go further in international contract cases than they do in domestic cases.
Article 28 does not face the problem of enforcement of a judgment for specific
performance. The question is left “to the procedural law of the country where enforcement is
sought”.203 An interesting situation can arise in relation to the 1968 Bruxelles Convention, now
constituting a law common to the European Union countries: a judgment for specific
performance of a member state will be enforceable in the U.K. even when in cases in which an
English court would not have granted such a remedy.
Even if Article 28 does not mention it, the provision is applicable to arbitral tribunal as
well. The “own law” is here the law which governs the arbitral procedure, in most cases
meaning the law of the place of arbitration.204
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Another applicable law provision is to be found in Article 42, a provision dealing with the
seller’s obligation to “deliver goods which are free from any right or claim of a third party based
on industrial property or other intellectual property”. This particular duty is expression of the
seller’s general obligation to deliver conforming goods pursuant to Article 35. This specific duty
is limited in two ways. First, the goods must be free only from those rights and claims “of which
at the time of the conclusion of the contract the seller knew or could not have been unaware”
(Article 42(1)). Second, and more important to this analysis, the seller is only responsible for
rights and claims based on the law of particular places: pursuant to Article 41(1)(a), if the parties
contemplated that the good would be resold or otherwise used in a particular State, the seller is
responsible only for rights or claims based on industrial or intellectual property under the law of
that State; if the parties did not contemplate any particular place where resale transactions would
occur or where the goods would be used, Article 42(1)(b) limits the buyer’s protection to rights
and claims “under the law of the State where the buyer has his place of business”.
This provision is clearly intended to protect the buyer’s commercial interests.

The

provision does not simply protect the buyer generically where his place of business is located,
but extends to safeguard his contractual expectations to resell or use the goods in a third country.
Article 42 makes applicable the domestic industrial/intellectual property law either of the buyer’s
State or of a different third State to which the buyer, at the time of the contract, intended to make
use of the goods.
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6.5. Gap Filling under the CISG
The CISG is the first of the conventions examined in this paper that faces the gap-filling
issue with an ad hoc provision.205 Article 7(2) is an innovative provision for at least two reasons.
First, it implicitly distinguishes between two different kinds of gaps: internal gaps and external
gaps, by an explicit definition of the former ones.206 Second, it gives a two-step solution to fill
internal gaps (as defined in Article 7(2)), thus indicating also a means to fill external gaps. A
separate analysis is therefore necessary.
6.5.1. Internal Gaps
Article 7(2) defines internal gaps as “questions concerning matters governed by this
Convention which are not expressly settled in it”. The Convention disposes that this kind of
questions, presenting a close connection with the uniform law, “are to be settled in conformity
with the general principles on which it is based or, in absence of such principles, in conformity
with the law applicable by virtue of the rules of private international law”. Thus, in the CISG is
not possible to resort immediately to the national law referred to by the applicable conflict of
laws rules when an internal gap is found. These questions, touched by the uniform law but
without any solution, are to be dealt with first in accordance to the Convention itself, through the
resort to general principles, (“general principles rule”). Only after this first inquiry has not
brought to any result, the CISG allows (and imposes) the recourse to the domestic law applicable
by virtue of the rules of private international law.
This mechanism presents two problems: first, it is necessary to determine when a gap is
internal in the sense of Article 7(2) or external, namely when a matter is governed by the
Convention or not and; second, and even more problematic, it is necessary to identify the
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“general principles” according to which such questions must be settled. The CISG provides us
with no guidance, so both questions are left to interpretation by the courts and generally accepted
principles underlying contract law.207
Only after this research has failed,208 even for internal gaps the Convention allows parties
to resort to the applicable national law, determined pursuant to the conflict of laws rules of the
forum.209 It has to born in mind, however, that under the Convention the recourse to the
applicable national law in these circumstances “is not only admissible, but even obligatory”.210
Two examples of internal gaps can be useful to see how the Article 7(2)’s mechanism
actually works. A very representative case is the question of the rate of interests on sums in
arrears. Under Article 78, “if a party fails to pay the price or any other sum that is in arrears, the
other party is entitled to interest on it”. The CISG, however, does not say anything about any
preferred methodology for calculating the rate of interest. The qualification of such a gap as
internal or external has been actually debated by scholars; in our opinion, however, it should be
considered an internal gap.211 The problem is that there is no specified approach in the CISG to
determining applicable interest rates. Thus, as Article 7(2) mandates, the applicable law is the
non-unified law, meaning the law which would be applicable to the sale were the contract not
207
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governed by the Convention.212 Another internal gap, on the contrary, has been dealt with by
adopting an internal solution, namely by recourse to general principles - the burden of proof. In
the CISG, there is no general provision expressly dealing with the burden of proof issue. But
some specific provisions contain wordings that are expressions of general principles on the
burden of proof and these basic principles can be used in order to fill the gap.213 From Article
79(1), which deals primarily with exemption from contractual liability, and Articles 39-39
(dealing with examination and rejection of defective goods by the buyer), it is possible to
synthesize the general rule that a party who wants to exercise a right must prove the facts on
which this right is based.214
The preference accorded to the general principles rule discussed in the foregoing
paragraph is easily understood when one contemplates the difficulties that references to private
international law creates in international transactions: “the uncertainties of the rules of private
international law, the difficulty of ascertaining foreign law and the possible incongruity between
pieces of domestic law and the overall plan of the Convention”.215 Moreover, an effort to fill in
the gaps through the general principles on which the CISG is based is consistent with the
mandate of Article 7(1) to interpret the Convention with regard to its international character and
the need to promote uniformity in its application.
211
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6.5.2. External gaps
The mechanism above described, on the contrary, does not apply to the other kind of
gaps, namely to questions concerning matters which the Convention does not govern or which it
expressly exclude from its scope of application. Such gaps, beyond the area of the gap-filling
rule under Article 7(2), are to be settled directly by applying the national non-unified law
designated by the private international law of the forum.216
As already discussed in this analysis, Article 4 excludes from the CISG’s scope of
application rationae materiae the validity of the contract or of any usage and Article 5 makes the
Convention not applicable to the liability of the seller for death or personal injury caused by the
goods.
In addition to these questions, there are many others not expressly excluded but implicitly
not covered by the Convention, which have been identified over the years by the courts:
existence of an agency relationship217, right of set-off,218 assignment of receivables,219 statute of
limitations,220 validity of a penalty clause,221 validity of a settlement agreement,222 assumption of
debt,223 novation,224 estoppel.225
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6.6. Conclusion
The CISG is the first of the conventions under our analysis that does not deal with
transportation and that, being not mandatory, expressly and broadly recognizes party autonomy,
by allowing parties both to exclude the applicability of it and to limit or derogate from one or
more of its provisions (and recognizing therefore the substitutive function of private international
law). The CISG is also the first law expressly adopting private international law as a general
instrument to integrate and to complete the overall discipline of international sale of goods, by
means of the gap-filling rule provided for by article 7 (2) (subsidiary function). The importance
of such new approach und utilization of private international law is confirmed by the strong
impact on subsequent uniform law conventions: the Ottawa conventions on international
factoring and international leasing, as well as the recent New York assignment convention
(which goes even further), are all based on the CISG approach, which seems to have established
a point of not return in the field of the relationship between uniform substantive law and private
international law.

The CISG, thus, represents the watershed in our paper between two

completing different approaches to uniformity in international commerce.
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CHAPTER 7
UNIDROIT CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL LEASING
AND
UNIDROIT CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL FACTORING
(OTTAWA CONVENTIONS), 1988

7.1. Introduction
In the year 1974, the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law
(UNIDROIT) began working on two draft conventions on international leasing and international
factoring. In May 1988, during a Diplomatic Conference held in Ottawa, these two projects were
brought to a conclusion by the adoption of the Convention on International Leasing (thereinafter
“the Leasing Convention”)226 and the Convention on International Factoring (thereinafter “the
Factoring Convention”).227
In the present study about the relationship between international uniform law and conflict
of laws rules, we will analyze these two Conventions (the “Ottawa Conventions”) in a single
chapter. Several reasons justify this approach. The Ottawa Conventions have been prepared by
the same international institution and in the same period of time. Their structure is almost
identical: both contain a chapter entitled “Sphere of Application and General Provisions”,
followed by a chapter on “Rights and Duties of the Parties”. Only the Factoring Convention
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provides an additional chapter on a particular issue, the “Subsequent Assignments”.

Both

Conventions end with the Chapter on “Final Provisions”; their length is not particularly
extended, only 23 Articles for the Factoring Convention and 25 for the Leasing Convention.
More important, however, both uniform laws present the same approach to conflict of laws
issues.

7.2. Ottawa Conventions’ Scope of Application
The Ottawa Conventions deal with situations presenting an element of internationality
and therefore potentially conflicting. The goal of both laws to overcome the uncertainty possibly
deriving from such contractual situations is made very clear already from their Preambles, where
it is stressed on one hand “the importance of removing certain legal impediments to the
international financial leasing of equipment” and on the other hand “the importance of adopting
uniform rules to provide a legal framework that will facilitate international factoring”.
7.2.1. Leasing Convention’s Scope of Application
Article 1 of the Leasing Convention defines the scope of application rationae materiae.
According to this provision, “leasing” is a transaction “in which one party (the lessor), (a) on the
specifications of another party (the lessee), enters into an agreement (the supply agreement) with
a third party (the supplier) under which the lessor acquires plant, capital goods or other
equipment (the equipment) on terms approved by the lessee so far as they concern its interests,
and (b) enters into an agreement (the leasing agreement) with the lessee, granting to the lessee
the right to use the equipment in return for the payment of rentals”. Paragraph 2 specifies other
characteristics that the financial leasing transaction must include, such as the (a) the lessee’s
specification of the equipment and selection of the supplier without reliance on the skill and
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judgment of the lessor; (b) the acquisition of the equipment by the lessor in connection with a
leasing agreement which, to the knowledge of the supplier, either has been made or is to be made
between the lessor and the lessee; and (c) the taking into account, in the calculation of the rentals
payable under the leasing agreement, of the amortisation of the whole or a substantial part of the
cost of the equipment.
The Convention provides therefore a “description” rather than a mere “definition”, of the
leasing transaction,228.which is due both to the particularly strong economic character of the
leasing transaction (which requires flexibility), and to the international character of the text in
which the description is embodied, a result of a compromise between different legal systems and
different legal definitions of the same transaction. In sum, the leasing transaction considered by
the Convention is a triangular relationship that involves (i) a supplier (who sells the equipment to
the lessor), (ii) a lessor (who finances the purchase of the equipment and lease it to the lessee)
and (iii) a lessee (who specifies the equipment and pays rentals to the lessor for the right to use
it) and two contracts, namely (a) the contract between the supplier and the lessor for the purchase
of the equipment and (b) the contract between the lessor and the lessee for the lease of the same
equipment.229
As already mentioned, the Convention applies only to the international leasing. Article 3
states that it applies when the lessor and the lessee have their places of business in different
States and: (a) those States and the State in which the supplier has its place of business are
228

Aldo Frignani, Convenzione Unidroit sul Leasing Finanziario Internazionale (1988), in LE CONVENZIONI DI
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INTERNATIONALS PRIVATRECHT, 724 (1987): “a great disappointment is the absence in the Draft Convention of
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Contracting States; or (b) both the supply agreement and the leasing agreement are governed by
the law of a Contracting State.
Like the CISG, the Leasing Convention first defines when the transaction may be
considered international by means of a subjective criterion (the place of business of the parties to
the lease); then it states the (two alternative) conditions of applicability.

Respect to the

conditions of applicability, it is interesting to point out that the condition sub (b) is designed to
make the Convention applicable even in the case that no party to the transaction has its place of
business in a contracting state. The reason is that, since it is necessary and sufficient that both
contracts of the transaction, the lessor-lessee contract and the lessor-supplier contract, be under a
law of a contracting state, such condition may be satisfied “either through affirmative choice of
law, or by virtue of conflict rules”.230 Article 3(1)(b) therefore “permits parties who are not
located in contracting states to have the Convention apply to their relationship through the use of
appropriate choice of law clauses”;231 if the lessor and the lessee have their place of business in
different (non contracting) states, choice of law clauses in the leasing and in the supply contract
can make applicable the law of a contracting state. This mechanism is possible, however, only
when “the conflict of laws rules of the forum recognize party autonomy in selecting the law
applicable to the contracts”.232
7.2.2. Factoring Convention’s Scope of Application
As far as the scope of application rationae materiae is concerned, Article 1 describes the
“factoring contract” as a contract concluded between the supplier and the factor, pursuant to
should be a supplement to international regulations. The reference to the subordinately applicable law under this
convention should be of particular significance, as the convention introduces a new type of contractual linkage”.
230
Id. at 274. Even though the statement cited is correct in the result, it is to be noticed that the choice of law by the
parties is itself a rule of conflict of laws; even more, it is the main rule of conflict of laws. See for instance the 1980
Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, Article 3.
231
Ronald Cuming, Legal Regulation Of International Financial Leasing: the 1988 Ottawa Convention, 7 ARIZ. J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 39, 50.

75

which: (a) the supplier will assign to the factor receivables arising from commercial contracts of
sale of goods made between the supplier and its customers (debtors); (b) the factor is to perform
at least two functions among finance for the supplier, maintenance of accounts relating to the
receivables, collection of receivables, protection against default in payment by debtors;233 (c)
notice of the assignment is to be given to debtors.234
Article 2 deals with the territorial scope of application. The Convention applies when the
receivables assignment pursuant to a factoring contract arise from a contract of sale of goods
between parties (supplier and debtor) that have their place of business in different States and: (a)
these States and the State of the factor are Contracting States; or (b) both the sale contract and
the factoring contract are governed by the law of a Contracting State.235 Like in the case of the
Leasing Convention, the criterion of applicability sub (b) could make the uniform law applicable
even if none of the parties to the transaction has its place of business in a contracting state. It
will be necessary, as already seen, to identify the laws applicable to the sale contract and to the
factoring contract by virtue to the conflict rules of the forum.
It is also interesting to point out that the “internationality” of the factoring is made per
relationem: it is actually based not on the factoring contract but on the underlying sale
contract.236 Therefore, in order to have an international factoring, it is necessary to have first an
international sale of goods. No doubt, then, that the internationality of the sale contract has to be
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determined according to the subjective criterion of the “different places of business of the
parties” set forth by Article 1 of the CISG.237

7.3. Party Autonomy
Both the Ottawa Conventions expressly recognize party autonomy. They are not
intended, therefore, to be mandatory.238 The extent to which such autonomy is allowed is,
however, different in the two Conventions and has to be separately analyzed.
Starting with the Leasing Convention, Article 5 states that “the application of this
Convention may be excluded only if each of the parties to the supply agreement and each of the
parties to the leasing agreement agree to exclude it” (Paragraph 1). In addition to the general
right to exclude the Convention, subject to the consent of all the actors of the leasing transaction,
Article 5 also provides a more limited right. Where the absence of a common will does not
permit to (totally or partially) exclude the Convention, “the parties may, in their relations with
each other, derogate from or vary the effect of any of its provisions except as stated in Article
8(3) and 13(3)(b) and (4)”. The parties to a specific relationship within the more complex
leasing transaction, namely supplier-lessor or lessor-lessee, may still exercise their contractual
autonomy by derogating from or by varying any uniform provision.239 Only three provisions do
not recognize party autonomy: Article 8(3), dealing with the lessor’s warranty of the lessee’s
quiet possession of the equipment where the superior title, right or claim is not derived from an
act or omission of the lessee); Article 13(3)(b), according to which damages must not be
substantially in excess of those that the lessor would have recovered had the lessee performed the
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leasing agreement in accordance with its terms;240 and article 13(4), which states that where the
lessor has terminated the leasing agreement, it shall not be entitled to enforce a term of that
agreement providing for acceleration of payment of future rentals.241
Party autonomy under the Factoring Convention is, on the contrary, less flexible. No
derogation, variation or partial exclusion is allowed but, according to Article 3, the application of
the Convention may be excluded “only as regards the Convention as a whole”.242 Moreover,
since the factoring transaction involves at least three subjects (factor, supplier, debtor and
sometimes subsequent assignees) and two bilateral contracts (the sale contract and the factoring
contract), the application of the Convention may be excluded by the parties to the factoring
contract or by the parties to the sale contract “as regards receivables arising at or after the time
when the factor has been given notice in writing of such exclusion”.243

7.4. Private International Law and Gap-Filling
As far as gap-filling is concerned, both the Ottawa Conventions contain the same rule,
which is derived literally from Article 7 of CISG. Leasing Convention’s Article 6(2) and
Factoring Convention’s Article 4(2) state that “questions concerning matters governed by this
Convention which are not expressly settled in it are to be settled in conformity with the general
principles on which it is based or, in absence of such principles, in conformity with the law
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applicable by virtue of the rules of private international law”.244 It can therefore be affirmed
about the Ottawa Conventions the same as for the CISG: these uniform laws are not intended to
be exhaustive codes.245
Some general principles are common in both uniform laws. For example, (i) the principle
of good faith in the international trade246, (ii) the principle of maintenance of “a fair balance of
interests between the different parties” to the leasing or factoring transaction,247 and (iii) the
principle of party autonomy.248
More specifically, within the Factoring Convention have been recognized the principle of
favor cessionis (even in the presence of a pactum de non cedendo between the supplier and the
debtor) and the principle of debtor protection (which prohibits placing the debtor in a worse
position as result of the assignment).249 As far as the Leasing Convention is concerned, the
following principles have been recognized: protection of lessee’s interests, the mitigation
principle and the principle of favor contractus.250
Where general principles cannot be found, gaps (both as to matters governed but not
settled, i.e. internal gaps, and as to matters not within the scope of the Conventions, i.e. external
gaps) are to be filled by recourse to the domestic law as determined by the conflict of laws rules
of the forum.251 In the cases in which the 1980 Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to
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relating primarily to the civil and commercial law aspects of international financial leasing” [emphasis added]. As
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Contractual Obligations is applicable, for example, the relationship between assignor and
assignee of a receivable is governed by the law applicable to the contract made between them
(lex contractus). The law applicable to the underlying contract is determined according to the
same Rome Convention, which makes applicable the law chosen by the parties (Article 3) or, in
the absence of such choice, the law of the state with which the contract has the closest
connection. The law applicable to the receivable, on the contrary, determines the receivable’s
negotiability and the relationship between assignee and debtor, namely the law that governs the
sale contract underlying the assignment (lex obligationis).252

7.5. Applicable Law Provisions
The Factoring Convention does not provide for any conflict rule, even though the matter
was discussed during the work sessions.253 Only the Leasing Convention contains specific
conflict rules.

Article 4(2) states that the Convention does not cease to apply when the

equipment has become a fixture to or incorporated in land and that “any question whether or not
the equipment has become a fixture to or incorporated in land, and if so the effect on the rights
inter se of the lessor and a person having real rights in the land, shall be determined by the law
of the State where the land is situated” (lex rei sitae). The convention expressly refers to a
national law for property rights, an area which is also expressly excluded from the scope of
application of the Vienna Convention and left to national rules.254

far as the Factoring Convention is concerned, there are gaps regarding the validity of the factoring contract, conflicts
among several assignees, conflicts between the factor and supplier’s creditors, relationship between the factor and
the supplier’s bankruptcy. See FERRARI, supra note 207, at 124; Torsello, supra note 233, at 125.
252
For a statement about the necessity to have recourse to private international law and an analysis of the
relationship between the Factoring Convention and the Rome Convention, see ERMANNO CALZOLAIO, IL
FACTORING IN EUROPA 129 – 131 (1997).
253
See id., at 143.
254
See Article 4(b) of the Vienna Convention, according to which the Convention is not concerned with “the effect
which the contract may have on the property in the goods sold”.
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Article 7 deals with the lessor’s real rights in the equipment against lessee’s creditors.
These rights, however, must be exercised according to the rules of the applicable law. Article
7(3) determines that the applicable law is the law of (a) the state where a ship is registered; (b)
the state in which an aircraft is registered pursuant to the Convention on International Civil
aviation done at Chicago in 1944; (c) the state in which the lessee has its principal place of
business in the case of an equipment of a kind normally moved from one State to another; or (d)
the state in which the equipment is situated in all other cases.
Other provisions then expressly refer to the law applicable by virtue of the rules of
private international law to determine the existence and the extent of particular rights and duties
of the parties (see Articles 7(5)(b) and 8(4)).

7.6. Provisions Implying Recourse to the Applicable Law
In addition to the provisions that expressly contain a conflict rule, there are also
provisions in the Conventions, whose actual content can be determined only by recourse to the
domestic applicable law. Since such provisions do not provide any specific conflict rule, the
applicable law is necessarily to be determined by virtue of the private international law of the
forum.
For example, under Article 10(1) of the Leasing Convention, “the duties of the supplier
under the supply agreement shall also be owed to the lessee as if it were a party to that
agreement and if the equipment were to be supplied directly to the lessee”. Such duties can be of
great importance to the lessee: if the law applicable to the supply agreement provides some
warranties of quality or performance of the equipment, these warranties will benefit also and
mainly the lessee. Moreover, “the lessee has an interest in the extent to which the applicable law
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permits the supplier to exclude or contract out of obligations with respect to the quality and
performance of the goods”.255 It is therefore necessary to identify the law applicable to the
supply agreement, which is a contract for the sale of goods. This contract is clearly governed by
the national law determined by the private international law of the forum, which may be a
national law, for instance when the parties have their place of business in the same state, or it
may be a uniform international law like the Vienna Convention for the sale of goods.
The determination of the applicable domestic law is also relevant with respect to the
lessor-lessee relationship. Article 12 specifies the remedies available to the lessee against the
lessor for defective performance by the supplier (right to reject the equipment; right to withhold
rentals payable under the leasing; right to terminate the leasing and recover any sums paid in
advance; lessor’s right to remedy). After listing the remedies, Article 12 states that “a right
conferred by the previous paragraph shall be exercisable in the same manner and shall be lost in
the same circumstances as if the lessee had agreed to buy the equipment from the lessor under
the same terms as those of the supply agreement”. This provision, clearly, “prescribes a choice
of law rule rather than a substantive rule of law”256. This mechanism however may cause some
problems. For example, what happens when the applicable law of sale does not recognize the
right of cure of the lessor-seller?257 How could a law regulate the exercise of a right that it does
not recognize? The approach according to which such a right would not be exercisable at all
seems to be inconsistent with the purpose of the Convention. A better approach is therefore
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Cuming, supra note 231, at 53.
Id. at 57. Article 12(2) has been criticized because of its necessary reference to a different law, which does not
favor uniformity.
257
This is the situation when the Sale of Goods Act, the sale law in the United Kingdom, applies. There is no
problem, however, when the applicable law is the Vienna Convention, since the seller’s right to cure is expressly
stated in article 48. However, the right to cure under CISG can be exercise differently, for example, from the UCC,
which also provides the seller with the right to cure (§ 2-508) but under different circumstances.
256
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simply not to adopt this law to determine the manner in which the right will be exercised.258
This lacuna could actually be avoided by the parties by inserting a clause in the leasing
agreement whereby the lessee, by accepting the goods, waives his rights to rejection or
termination pursuant to article 12.259
The Factoring Convention, in its Article 10, deals with the debtor’s right to recover a sum
in case of non-performance or defective or late performance of the contract of sale of goods. The
Convention, however, does not provide any definition or regulation of the breach of the sale
contract; it is necessary, therefore, to apply the lex contractus to be identified by virtue of the
conflict rules of the forum.260 The Convention does not simply refer to the applicable law, but
limits itself the debtor’s right to recover; the debtor is bound to recover first from the supplier
and only after such unsuccessful attempt may bring action against the factor. Thus, Article 10
has a dual nature. On the one hand, it is a substantive provision that regulates and limits the
debtor’s right to recover; on the other hand, it is a conflict rule as to the reference to the breach
of the underlying sale contract and to the existence of the recovery action.261

7.7. Conclusion
The Ottawa Conventions are broadly debtors to the CISG.262 Both are not intended to be
mandatory and do recognize party autonomy, even though the Leasing Convention does that in a
wider way, according to the CISG model, and the Factoring Convention limit the parties’ choice
to a “take-it-or-leave-it” option.

Both are intended to be not an exhaustive and complete
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Cuming, supra note 231, at 58.
Levy, supra note 241, at 282 (“as a matter of sound business practice, the lessor will require the lessee to verify
in writing prior to the payment of the supplier that it received and accepted the equipment, that the equipment is
conforming as specified, and that the lessee agrees to be bound by its normally absolute obligation to pay under the
leasing agreement”).
260
FERRARI, supra note 207, at 305.
261
Id. at 332.
259
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discipline of the relevant subject matters and do provide the same “two level” gap-filling rule:
recourse to general principle where possible, otherwise external solution by recourse to the
(domestic) law as determined by private international law of the forum.
The role of the non-uniform applicable law is also recognized by the Leasing Convention,
which contains specific conflict rules (the lex rei sitae or other connecting factors regarding the
lessor’s real rights in the equipment against the lessee’s creditors) directly determining the
domestic law governing particular issues. Moreover, the application of several provisions in
both Conventions necessarily implies the prior determination of the substantive applicable law,
an issue that is to be dealt with by means of the applicable conflict rules (not specified by the
Conventions).
Even though the impact of the Ottawa Conventions on international trade cannot still be
determined, it’s difficult to predict their significant success, especially if compared with the
experience of the CISG. As a careful literature has pointed out,263 with specific reference to the
Factoring Convention but with considerations that may be well extended also to the sister
convention on Leasing, it seems that these uniform laws have consolidated the common basis
already existing in the most important legal systems rather than establishing new uniform
solutions for issues presenting significant differences.264 For example, the Factoring Convention
does not face issues like the relationships between different factoring companies (the so called
“interfactors agreements”) or conflicts between the factoring company and third parties having
rights on the assigned credits,265 issues that are differently disciplined at international level and
that therefore may frequently give rise to conflicts and would need a uniform rule. What just
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See Torsello, supra note 233, at 138.
ERMANNO CALZOLAIO, supra note 252, at 144; Torsello, supra note 233, at 137.
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ERMANNO CALZOLAIO, supra note 252, at 145.
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Id. at 144.
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mentioned should confirm, on one hand, the intrinsic limit of uniform (substantive) conventions
as the only instrument to face conflicting issues in international trade (especially in cases – like
the Ottawa Conventions – where the uniform discipline is quite brief) and, on the other hand, the
need to a new approach to the use of private international law, an example of which is the
convention analyzed in the next chapter, the last one of this paper.
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CHAPTER 8
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE ASSIGNMENT OF RECEIVABLES IN
INTERNATIONAL TRADE, 2001

8.1. Introduction
The final uniform law examined in this paper is the United Nations Convention on the
Assignment of Receivables in International Trade (hereinafter referred to as the “Assignment
Convention”), adopted in its final version in New York by the General Assembly on 12
December 2001.266 The underlying purpose of this Convention, like other international uniform
law in its respective field, is to foster, promote and document international agreement on some
basic rules on assignment of receivables by (a) removing legal obstacles to certain international
financing practices (e.g. by validating assignment of future receivables and bulk assignments,
and by partially invalidating contractual limitations to the assignment of receivables); (b)
enhancing certainty and predictability regarding to the law applicable to some key issues
(priority among competing claims) and (c) by harmonizing domestic assignment regulations.267
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85th General Assembly plenary meeting, New York, 12.12.2001, Resolution A/RES/56/81. The Uncitral
Convention on the Assignment of Receivables in International Trade has been signed or ratified by four states
(Liberia, Luxembourg, Madagascar and United States of America) by January 2007. Since a number of five actions
are required for entry into force, the Convention is not yet in force.
267
According to one of the main draftsmen of the Convention, Spiros V. Bazinas, Lowering the Cost of Credit: the
Promise in the Future UNCITRAL Convention on Assignment of Receivables in International Trade, 9 TUL. J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 259, 263, “the purpose of this law was to remove legal obstacles to financing transactions by
eliminating uncertainty as to the validity of international assignments or assignments of international receivables”.
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There is still very little commentary on the Convention because it has been only recently
adopted and is not yet in force.268 In addition, there are no judicial decisions yet rendered.
Nevertheless, the Convention presents an original approach to the relationship between uniform
substantive law and private international law.

It not only contains a reference to private

international law as ultima ratio gap filling method, which was already present in the CISG and
in the two Ottawa Conventions on Factoring and Leasing. Even more, the Convention contains a
very innovative chapter entitled “Autonomous conflict-of-laws rules”,269 which provides several
conflict rules dealing with issues related to the main subject matter of the assignment, such as the
form of a contract of assignment, the mutual rights and obligations of the assignor, the assignee
and the debtor, etc..
For the first time, conflict rules are used not just occasionally within a single provision to
deal with a specific problem, but are considered uniformly as a body of rules existing within a
uniform commercial law convention. The Convention, however, goes even further. Pursuant to
Article 1(4), Chapter V on “Autonomous conflict-of-laws rules” applies to assignments of
international receivables independently of the occurrence of the territorial requirements, i.e.
“irrespective of whether the assignor or the debtor is located in a State party to the
Convention”.270 This means, in other words, that Chapter V is, in fact, an independent “mini”
private international law convention.271

268

The Convention will entry into force upon the deposit of five instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or
accession.
269
In the comment of one of the main drafters, Franco Ferrari, The UNCITRAL Draft Convention on Assignment in
Receivables Financing: Applicability, General Provisions and the Conflict of Conventions, 3 (2000), at
http://www.law.unimelb.edu.au/mjil/issues/archieve/2000/2ferrari.html, the Convention is in this field “innovative”
and Chapter V is “a rare occurrence in substantive law conventions”.
270
Bazinas, supra note 267, at 259.
271
In his comment about the Draft Convention in the year 2000, Ferrari, supra note 216, at 3, expressing a strong
criticism about including Chapter V in the final version, said: ”one can only hope that it will be deleted, above all
because, according to the current version of the Draft Convention, Chapter V would be applicable – unless a specific
reservation were declared – in a Contracting State independently of whether or not the territorial requirements are

87

8.2. Scope of Application
Pursuant to Article 1(1), the Convention applies (i) to assignments of international
receivables and (ii) to international assignments of receivables if, at the time the contract of
assignment is concluded, the assignor is located in a contracting State. “Assignment” is defined
(Article 2(a)) as the transfer by agreement from the assignor to the assignee of all or part of or an
undivided interest in the assignor’s contractual right to payment of a monetary sum
(“receivable”) from the debtor. Receivable is, therefore, “defined broadly to include payment
rights arising from any contract”.272 In particular, under the Convention, there is no doubt that
assignments of future receivables and bulk assignments constitute valid assignments.273
More important is then the definition of the “internationality” requirement.274 Article 3
qualifies a receivable as international if the assignor and the debtor are located in different
States. An assignment is deemed to be international, again under Article 3, if the assignor and
the assignee are located in different states.275 In both situations, the criterion is subjective and is
the location of the two involved parties in two different states. In order for the Convention to
apply, it is then necessary that the assignor, who is the party present both in the original contract
and in the contract of assignment, be located in a contracting state.

met”. The final version of the Convention as adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations, however, has
maintained Chapter V without any changes.
272
Bazinas, supra note 267, at 259.
273
Id.
274
See Ferrari, supra note 269, at 5, who notices that for many years, the drafters of international uniform
commercial law conventions have been directing their efforts merely to covering situations which can somehow be
defined as “international””.
275
In this case, the Convention is applicable even if the assignor and the debtor have their place of business in the
same state.
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8.3. Party Autonomy
Like the CISG and (at least one of) the Ottawa Conventions, the Convention at hand
expressly and broadly recognizes party autonomy. Under Article 6, “the assignor, the assignee
and the debtor may derogate from or vary by agreement provisions of this Convention relating to
their respective rights and obligations”. Since the assignment necessarily involves not only the
two parties to it, but also a third party (the debtor), Article 6 adds that the agreement derogating
or varying any provision “does not affect the rights of any person who is not a party to the
agreement”. Unlike the CISG276 or the Ottawa Factoring Convention,277 however, the parties
may not exclude the Convention as a whole.
The Convention, therefore, is not intended as a mandatory regime for the international
assignment of receivables, but only as a non-comprehensive code,278 whose application is
supplementary to the contractual party autonomy.

8.4. Convention and Gap-Filling
Like in the most recent uniform commercial law conventions, the drafters have been
conscious of the fact that the Convention does not constitute an exhaustive set of rules and that
therefore guidance in filling the gaps was necessary.279

Accordingly, Article 7(2) states:

“questions concerning matters governed by this Convention which are not expressly settled in it
are to be settled in conformity with the general principles on which it is based or, in absence of

276

Article 6.
Article 3.
278
This very obvious but important comment is also made by Bazinas, supra note 267, at 294.
279
See Ferrari, supra note 269, at 15.
277
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such principles, in conformity with the law applicable by virtue of the rules of private
international law”.280
Even if the Convention has not yet received widespread attention, it is possible to
recognize at least some of the principles on which it is based. The Preamble, for example,
stresses that one of the purpose in drafting the Convention is the necessity to ensure adequate
protection for the debtor.281 Accordingly, Article 15(1) states that the assignment does not affect
rights and obligations of the debtor, including the payment terms contained in the original
contract, Article 18(1) says that, in a claim by the assignee against the debtor, “the debtor may
raise against the assignee all defences and rights of set-off arising from the original contract, or
any other contract that was part of the same transaction, of which the debtor could avail itself as
if the assignment had not been made and such claim were made by the assignor”. In other
words, the debtor may not be put in a worse position merely because of the assignment.282 Party
autonomy seems also to be a general principle of the Convention. Not only does Article 6
characterize party autonomy as a general principle, but other provisions also make clear that
parties have the right to “structure their transactions to meet their needs”.283 Good faith is also a
principle expressly referred to in the Convention, as Article 7(1) states that the Convention must
be interpreted having regard to promote the observance of good faith in international trade.
Another general principle that can be easily found is then that of favor cessionis.

The

Convention gives effectiveness to assignments “of more than one receivable, future receivables
or parts of or undivided interests in receivables” (Article 8(1)) and “notwithstanding any
280

The Conventions uses the same wording of the CISG (Article 7(2)), the Ottawa Factoring Convention (Article
4(2)) and the Ottawa Leasing Convention (Article 6(2)).
281
The principle of debtor protection is then embodied in Article 17 (Debtor’s discharge by payment).
282
Ferrari, , supra note 269, at 17.
283
Bazinas, supra note 267, at 266. See Article 19, under which debtor and assignor may agree not to raise defences
on rights of set-off. Contra Ferrari, supra note 269, at 16, in whose opinion the impossibility for the parties to
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agreement between the initial or any subsequent assignor and the debtor or any subsequent
assignee limiting in any way the assignor’s right to assign its receivables” (Article 9(1)).
Anothyer key-principle is, finally, the facilitation of access to lower-cost credit.284

8.5. A Specific Conflict Rule: Article 22 on “Competing Rights”
Before discussing Chapter V, we find a specific conflict rule in Section III of Chapter IV,
dealing with third parties’ rights and obligations. Article 22 states that “the law of the State in
which the assignor is located governs the priority of the right of an assignee in the assigned
receivable over the right of a competing claimant” (lex cedentis).
This provision gives us a chance to touch a more general question, namely whether the
reference to the a particular domestic “law” in an international convention is intended to
comprehend the private international law of that state or merely its substantive law.

The

Convention provides us with a clear answer. Article 5, which deals with definitions and rules of
interpretation, clarifies under paragraph (i) that “law” means only the law in force in a state
“other than its rules of private international law’. Thus, for a judge applying the Convention
will be not only unnecessary, it will also be prohibited to apply a substantive law other than that
expressly referred to in Article 22.285

exclude in toto the Convention would render unsustainable to think the party autonomy is a general principle upon
which the Convention is based.
284
Bazinas, supra note 267, at 265.
285
It is interesting to note that only another uniform commercial law contains a definition of “national law” and it is
opposite from that here at hand. The 1980 CIM on international carriage of goods by rail expressly states in Article
10(2) that national law must be intended as including the rules relating to conflict of laws.
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8.6. The Autonomous Conflict-of-Law Rules
The real innovation of the Convention is, however, the introduction of a part completely
dealing with conflict rules. Actually, Chapter V seems to be a “mini” private international law
convention.
8.6.1. Scope of Application
According to Article 26, Chapter V applies (a) to matters that are within the scope of the
Convention as provided in article 1(4), i.e. to assignments of international receivables and to
international assignments of receivables; (b) and to matter that are otherwise within the scope of
the Convention but not settled elsewhere in it. Two elements are here to be highlighted for the
reader. First, Article 1(4) states that the provisions of Chapter V apply “independently” of the
territorial requirements set forth in paragraphs 1 to 3 of Article 1 (i.e., when the assignor or the
debtor are located in a Contracting State).

Thus, Chapter V applies every time that the

“internationality” requirement for the receivables or for the assignments is met, even though the
substantive rules of the Convention are not applicable. Accordingly, a forum in a contracting
state dealing with international assignments or international receivables will be bound to apply
Chapter V, even if the rest of the Convention is not applicable because, for example, at the time
of conclusion of the contract of assignment the assignor was not located in a contracting state
(Article 1(a)). Second, a forum dealing with an internal gap, i.e. a gap within the scope of the
uniform law but not settled in it and that cannot be filled in by recourse to any general principle,
will have to apply not the substantive law applicable by virtue of the rules of its private
international law (lex fori), but the law applicable by virtue of the rules stated in Chapter V.286
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Similarly see id. at 288, according to whom “where the provisions of chapter V apply to transactions that are
within the scope of the material law provisions of the Convention, they apply only to matters not settled in the other
provisions of the Convention”. Another question is to be addressed: as professor Ferrari noticed, the rule on the gapfilling in Article 7(2) should be applicable also to Chapter V, since the Convention does not provide any limitation.
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The “traditional” criterion of the private international law of the forum’ remains of course
applicable for the external gaps, i.e. for the gaps outside the scope of the Convention. We have
here, therefore, two different kinds of private international law: (i) the “uniform” private
international law set forth in the Convention, and (ii) the domestic private international law of
the forum.287
8.6.2. The Conflict Rules
Chapter V provides a specific conflict rule for every issue it faces. As far as the form of
the contract of assignment is concerned, Article 27 encompasses two cases.
(a) When a contract is concluded between persons who are located in the same state, the
agreement is valid “if it satisfies the requirements of either the law which governs it or the law of
the State in which it is concluded”. This provision refers to the case where internationality lays
in the receivable and not in the assignment. In such a situation, the governing law is the law
which governs the contract; this law has to be determined by the forum, but it is very likely to be
the law of the states where the parties are located. If under this law the contract is not formally
valid, and if it is concluded in another state, the law of this State is also applicable. This
provision is quite clearly intended to favor the formal validity of the assignment and its reason is
to be found in the general principle of the favor cessionis. (b) The second case faced by article
27 is the probably more frequent situation where the contract in concluded between parties
located in different states. The governing law is that which governs the contract (determined by

If it is true, “one has to wonder whether the drafters are aware of this: do they really want to oblige the interpreters
to identify general principles of private international law upon which the [at the time this has been written] Draft
Convention is based?”. See Ferrari, supra note 216, at 16.
287
According to Ferrari, supra note 269, at 17, this is an open question: “one must wonder” – he says – “which
private international law is to be taken into account in identifying that domestic law: the original domestic law, that
laid down by the Draft Convention, or, maybe both?”. The ideal solution, for the commentator, would have been the
deletion of Chapter V from the Draft Convention, which however has not happened.
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the private international law of the forum) or the law of one of the states. Again, this provision
tries to favor the validity of the assignment.
With respect to the law applicable to the mutual rights and obligations of the assignor
and the assignee, Article 28 states that the first applicable law is the law chosen by the parties.
In the absence of such a choice, the governing law is the law of the state with which the contract
of assignment is most closely connected. The common law criterion of the “proper law” is
therefore here adopted by the Convention.
The relationship between the assignee and the debtor is governed by the law governing
the original contract (Article 29). This provision is clearly based on the general principle of
debtor protection. The assignment, because it is a transaction to which the debtor is not a party,
should not make worse or in any way change the debtor’s contractual position without his
consent. The Convention, therefore, refers to the law already governing the position of the
debtor. It avoids, however, indicating how to identify the proper law of the original contract; it
has been said that “it would be inappropriate to attempt to determine the law governing the wide
variety of contracts that might be at the origin of the receivable, such as contracts of sale,
insurance contracts, and contracts relating to financial markets operations”.288 An example can
be useful. If the receivable comes from an international contract of sale of goods (as it can easily
be in international trade) and the necessary requirements are met, this law might be the CISG.
However, the CISG seems not to be the proper law to solve questions as between an assignee and
his debtor, such as “contractual limitations on assignment” or “the conditions under which the
assignment can be invoked against the debtor” (Article 29). Thus, it will be necessary to
determine the law that would apply to the sale contract if the CISG were not applicable. For
example when the 1980 Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations is
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applicable, the governing law is that of the state where the seller (the creditor) has his principal
place of business. The governing law under Article 29 should often be, therefore, the law of the
assignor.
Article 30 deals with the law applicable to priority. This could be quite surprising, since
“the Convention’s primary rule dealing with priority issues is a conflict-of-laws rule”.289 Such
solution could be problematic in the course of business and of course it does not promote
uniformity of results. The contracting states may avoid such inconvenient outcome by opting the
Annex containing substantive priority rules based either on registration or on the time of the
contract of assignment or on the time of notification of assignment. Nevertheless, a clear
conflict rule is much more advantageous than many possible different rules depending on the
different forum.290 Article 30 provides a rule different from a traditional conflict of law approach
(law chosen by the parties or law governing the receivable):291 in case the receivable has been
assigned to more than one assignee, the governing law is the law of the state in which the
assignor is located. Every priority conflict has to be dealt with by a single and easily predeterminable law. The provisions of the law of the assignor are applicable notwithstanding
mandatory rules of the law of the forum. Paragraph 3 deals with the conflict of laws in case of
an insolvency proceeding commenced in a state other than the state of the assignor, whose law
governs according to paragraph 1. In this case, however, “any preferential right that arises, by
operation of law, under the law of the forum State and is given priority over the rights of an
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Bazinas, supra note 267, at 289.
Id. at 286.
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See id.: “a clear conflict-of-laws rule has economic value in that by informing potential parties to financing
transactions about the applicable law it would allow parties to obtain priority. This would be a significant
improvement compared with the present situation where parties often do not know which law applies to priority
issues and, as result, must meet the requirements of several jurisdictions”.
291
Id.
289
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assignee in insolvency proceedings under the law of that State may be given priority
notwithstanding paragraph 1”.
Article 31 mitigates the conflict between the law applicable to the rights and obligations
of the three subjects of an assignment (Articles 28 and 29) and the mandatory rules of the law of
the forum or of the law of another state with which the matter has a close connection. The
Convention gives precedence to the mandatory rules, whose application cannot be restricted by
the application of the law as determined by the uniform conflict rules of Articles 28 and 29.
The last Article of Chapter V (Article 32) states that the application of a provision of the
law determined by the uniform conflict rules “may be refused only if the application of that
provision is manifestly contrary to the public policy of the forum State”.

8.7. Conclusion
The Convention on the Assignment of Receivables contains elements common also to
other international conventions, such as the CISG and the two Ottawa Conventions: the
recognition of the party autonomy, the provision of specific applicable law rules and the
adoption of the general gap-filling principle by means of private international law.
What is totally new is the part on autonomous conflict of law rules. For the first time,
specific conflict rules which directly determine the domestic governing law are organized within
an autonomous chapter. Furthermore, this chapter is made applicable even when the substantive
part of the Convention cannot be applied. This outcome can be criticized, since it renders a
simple chapter of a substantive law convention a “mini” private international law convention292
and it allows a very wide application to laws other than those of the assignor. Moreover, the
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Chapter V allows considering the Assignment Convention as a “mixed substantive law and private international
law convention”, even though some scholars refer to it to a “choice of law convention” tout court.
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Convention’s conflict rules could be difficult to reconcile with the provisions of the 1980 Rome
Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations for the cases in which this last one
applies. It can be already said that some states will exercise the right to make a reservation in
order to limit the scope of application of Chapter V only to those cases in which the whole of the
Convention is to be applied or even in order not to be bound by Chapter V at all. 293
Nevertheless, Chapter V and its broad scope of application have a particular meaning:
they are a new way to deal with the issue of uniformity and predictability. The Preamble of the
Convention makes clear that a general goal of this uniform law – which is valid for any uniform
law – is “the promotion of international trade through the minimization of legal
uncertainties”.294 It is also expressly recognized that “problems created by uncertainties as to
the content and the choice of legal regime applicable to the assignment of receivables constitute
an obstacle to international trade”.295 Uniformity is a goal that can be reached not only by
enacting uniform substantive laws, but also – and maybe better – by providing clear and specific
ad hoc international uniform conflict rules.

293

The Gran Duchy of Luxembourg has declared pursuant to Article 39 that it does not wish to be bound by Chapter

V.

294
295

Ferrari, supra note 269, at 4.
See Preamble (emphasis added).
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CHAPTER 9
CONCLUSIONS

This paper has analyzed a seventy year long history of attempts to unify certain important
areas of international commercial law. We have tried to make evident that, from the very
beginning of such attempts, international drafters had always to deal with the problem of a
possible different choice of law by the parties and of the proper use of private international law.
The first group of conventions here analyzed, dealing with different forms of
international carriage, presents a very strict approach to private international law. All these
conventions expressly state that they are mandatory when regulating matters within their scope
of application and that any different choice of law by the parties is just “null and void”.296 Party
autonomy, the main private international law connecting factor,297 is therefore barred.
Nevertheless, such conventions do contain provisions that make applicable a law other than the
uniform discipline:298 the Warsaw Convention in five cases makes applicable the (substantial)
law of the forum; the Hamburg Rules refer in specific cases to the law of the port of loading, the
law of the port of discharge, the law of the place where the bill of loading was issued and the law
of the forum; the CMR provides several connecting factors such as the law of the forum, the law
of the place where the contract was made and the law of the place where the goods are situated;
296

See ANGELO PESCE, supra note 22, at 34.
That party autonomy is the first connecting factor in private international law is confirmed, for instance, by
article 2 of the The Hague Convention on the law applicable to international contracts for the sale of goods of 1955
and by article 3 of the Rome Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations of 1980. See also
ANTONIO MALINTOPPI, supra note 3, at 18 and FRANCO FERRARI, supra note 5, at 147-148.
298
See ANTONIO MALINTOPPI, supra note 3, at 33, according to whom such (instrumental) provisions are with no
doubt “private international law rules”.
297
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finally, the CIM refers to the law of the forum, the law of the place where the contract was made,
the law of the place where the contract was to be performed and the law of the place where the
goods were situated on a specific time. It appears clear that this group of conventions intends to
achieve uniformity by granting the most effective and exclusive force to the unified rules and by
strongly limiting the recourse to non-uniform rules. Only direct applicable law provisions are
provided, so that the role of private international law is limited and “under control”. In fact, such
uniform rules are drafted to be an autonomous and mandatory system, impermeable and
preempting any other rule not expressly referred to.299
The second group of laws analyzed in this paper has a very different approach to extern
rules. All of them – the CISG, the two Ottawa Conventions and the Assignment Convention –
expressly recognize party autonomy (even though not in the same width) as a factor to make
applicable a different law or to limit or even to exclude the application of the uniform rules. The
mandatory character of the carriage conventions is replaced by the opportunity for merchants to
adapt the rules to their needs (and to their relevant contractual power). Private international law
is also the common instrument provided in order to fill in the gaps: not only external gaps, for
which private international law is the only possible way, but also internal gaps, so that the
uniform discipline becomes in fact less uniform than expected. Finally, the role of private
international law in the field of uniform laws is brought even further in the Assignment
Convention, which not only governs some key issues (such as the priority among competing
claimants) by means of conflict of law provisions but also sets forth an autonomous set of
applicable law rules that may be made applicable by the parties even independently from the
application of the uniform substantive rules.

299

Such character of carriage conventions is justified by the social function of the carriage of goods; see id. at 40.
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This journey through some of the most important commercial law conventions of the last
seventy years should then allow us to make some final considerations and to suggest an answer
to the key question that has been formulated in the introduction to this paper, namely which type
of relationship between private international law and international conventions can serve
uniformity in international trade at best.
Unification of substantive rules is not the ultimate answer to the need for uniformity in
international commercial legal traffic. Even it is to recognize that uniform commercial law
conventions are a significant and unavoidable instrument to set a common ground of rules to
govern international transactions300 and therefore to promote certainty and predictability in
international trade, uniform laws are nevertheless not sufficient to achieve the goal of uniformity
because of their intrinsic incapacity to provide rules for all the issues deriving from an
international contract.301 This lack of uniform substantive rules may be actually sometimes
necessary to provide uniform conventions with a certain degree of flexibility and make them
suitable for adoption by a larger number of states.302

We have seen then that private

international law, an instrument that by itself fails “to reach a satisfactory degree of simplicity
and predictability” 303 as usually leading to diverging and conflicting results, is the way to deal
with issues that cannot be solved within uniform laws.
Is therefore uniformity in international commercial law a mirage? We think that this is a
matter of approach. Uniform substantive law and private international law are both tools that
should be used together in order to reach the highest possible level of uniformity and they should

300

Some authors speak about “superiority of uniform substantive rules over private international law”. See MARCO
TORSELLO, COMMON FEATURES OF UNIFORM COMMERCIAL LAW CONVENTIONS 249 (2004).
301
See ANTONIO MALINTOPPI, supra note 3, at 31.
302
For this consideration see MARCO TORSELLO, supra note 300, at 211.
303
See id. at 5.
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not be considered as conflicting.304 If international conventions are the best instrument to
establish a fundamental basis of common rules to be accepted by the largest possible number of
countries, private international law - when properly used - is on the other hand the suitable way
to deal with matters that, due to their specificity, may find a better solution at a national level.305
As we have seen in this paper, private international law is not irrelevant even in presence of
uniform laws,306 that are helpful but represent often only a starting point of the complex legal
work of determining the overall legal discipline of an international commercial transaction - a
work which becomes more complicated and whose results are less certain when the impact of
private international law is just ignored. Drafters of international conventions should therefore
not ignore such impact but on the contrary should make any efforts in order to control it and to
use conflict rules to support the application of uniform provisions.307
According to our suggestion, international drafters should therefore consider private
international law just as another way to grant uniformity and try to coordinate applicable law
provisions and substantive disciplines in the same international instrument.

Of course the

uniformity granted by this approach works at two different levels. If uniform substantive rules
make certain the final legal provision to be applied, uniform applicable law provisions make
certain only the rule leading to a particular (non-uniform) provision which may vary from case to

304

For a similar statement see id. at 53 (“the relationship between private international law and uniform substantive
law should be studied in terms of coordination, rather than comparison of the respective solutions”).
305
According to id. at 249 “ private international law has a relevant role to play even in those areas where the
substantive law has been unified”.
306
See expressly the analysis carried out in this paper at 32.
307
On this point is significant the statement of a leading author, according to which “it is a myth – rather than reality
– that uniform substantive law conventions do exclude – or at least substantially reduce – the need to have recourse
to private international law rules, a myth that will raise transaction costs for the party that relies upon it”; see
FRANCO FERRARI, CISG AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE 1980 UNIFORM SALES LAW. OLD ISSUES
REVISITED IN LIGHT OF RECENT EXPERIENCES 21 (2003).
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case.308 However, the conflict provisions will be uniform and certain in advance and parties to
an international contract should be able to predict the final rule to be applied, a result that can be
hardly obtained when no uniform applicable law provision is provided.
Our position, therefore, is that uniformity in international trade can be served at best by
an intelligent coordination of both instruments. An example of such approach is the Assignment
Convention, where unification of substantive law is carried out together with unification of
private international law provisions related to the matter.309

308

According to FRANCO FERRARI, supra note 19, at 14, a total unification of disciplines concerning matters
governed by international conventions, if private international law becomes relevant, is not achievable.
309
Scholars use the term of “combined method” to describe the technique of unification of private international law
and substantive law in the same international instrument. See MARCO TORSELLO, supra note 300, at 257.
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